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SECTION 363 SALES: MOOTING DUE PROCESS?
ABSTRACT
The use of § 363 sales has become immensely popular. The mechanism is
no longer used just to get cash funding through the reorganization, but to
dispose of the bankruptcy petition altogether. The primary benefit of § 363
sales is their speed. The Lehman Brothers, Chrysler, and General Motors
bankruptcies demonstrated exigent situations in which courts approved quick
§ 363 sales to avoid the risk of allowing such large companies to fail. The
speed of § 363 sales provides an efficient mechanism to obtain cash without
confirming a reorganization plan, but this speed also leaves creditors
vulnerable to due process violations because of the condensed time frame.
Once a court authorizes a § 363 sale, respect for the finality of good faith
purchases makes creditors’ opportunity for appellate review very limited.
Final sale orders are immune from modification or reversal by the mootness
provision in § 363(m). The shroud of mootness can compel debtors to create
an emergency situation, forcing courts to choose between approving abridged
procedural protections and compromising a successful reorganization. This
Comment will demonstrate how Chrysler and GM serve as examples for how
debtors and powerful asset purchasers can use § 363 to expedite and moot
creditor due process. This Comment suggests that protecting due process is an
equally important pillar of bankruptcy law as finality and makes
recommendations to mitigate creditors’ lack of remedies in § 363 sales without
sacrificing the principle of finality.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades, § 363 sales have become an increasingly
common and controversial method to reorganize financially distressed
companies. Section 363 offers a distressed company an efficient mechanism to
obtain cash for its reorganization. By condensing the bankruptcy process,
§ 363 sales make creditors’ due process rights especially vulnerable.
Nonetheless, once a court authorizes a sale, a creditor has very little
opportunity to appeal.
Section 363 sales allow a trustee or debtor-in-possession (“DIP”) to use,
sell, or lease all or substantially all of the property of the estate, outside the
ordinary course of business, provided there is notice and hearing of the sale.1
Since the addition of § 363 to the Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”),2 § 363 sales
are increasingly used not only to obtain cash to fund the reorganization
process, but to sell entire companies and dispose of the bankruptcy without a
plan. The surge of § 363 sales corresponds with debtors increasingly using
chapter 11 as a means to sell a business.3 More than twenty percent of chapter
11 cases are disposed of through § 363 sales.4
Finality is a vital pillar of bankruptcy: it creates certainty that parties can
continue in reorganization without being mired in endless litigation. In § 363
sales, finality encapsulates that reverence for bona fide purchasers.5 Ensuring
finality encourages participation in reorganizations and increases the amount
bidders are willing to pay for debtors’ assets.6 Congress emphasized finality by
incorporating § 363(m), which moots appeals of authorized § 363 sales.7 Thus,
1 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (2006). While the statute refers to the “trustee,” the debtor in possession may
exercise all the rights afforded to the trustee. Id. §1107.
2 See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 181–82 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6301–03
(discussing the legislative intent of the section).
3 Douglas G. Baird, The New Face of Chapter 11, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 69, 80–81 (2004)
(stating three-quarters of bankruptcies are used to sell the company). As of 2002, of the ten largest
bankruptcies, eight used the bankruptcy court to sell their assets to the highest bidder. Id; see also Appendix A,
Chart I.
4 This is true for 2003–2009; 2010 data does not yet bear this out. 363 Sales of All or Substantially All
Assets in Large, Public Company Bankruptcies, as a Percentage of All Cases Disposed, by Year of Case
Disposition, AM. BANKR. INST. (last visited on Oct. 5, 2012), http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu/tables_and_graphs/
363_sale_percentage_graph_4-6-2011.pdf.
5 The terms “bona fide purchaser” and “good faith purchaser” are synonymous. A good faith purchaser’s
purchase for value has a superior right to purchased property to transferor’s creditors, even if the transferor
defrauds the creditor. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1355 (9th ed. 2009).
6 In re Sax, 796 F.2d 994, 997 (7th Cir. 1986).
7 11 U.S.C. § 363(m) (2006); see also infra Part I.B.
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if undiscovered oversights or mistakes occur prior to the sale’s authorization,
creditors have extremely limited options for appellate review.8
The right of aggrieved parties to have adverse decisions reviewed competes
with a strong policy of finality.9 Courts face the challenge of juggling
competing claims to fashion the optimal relief to all creditors. Standards for
sale approval give great weight to the debtor’s and buyer’s insistence that the
sale be done urgently. Though this urgency may be authentic, it poses the
danger of tipping the scales too heavily in favor of a debtor in a conflict with a
creditor. Because creditors have limited recourse for grievances postauthorization, courts must strive to balance the scales prior to sale
confirmation.
This Comment addresses the competing polices that materialize in § 363
proceedings: due process for all parties affected by a sale and protecting the
viability of sales through finality. Part I discusses the efficiency of § 363 sales,
while demonstrating the negative ramifications of the diminished protections
for creditors. Part II examines the concerns that can arise with quick sales
through discussion of the Chrysler and General Motors bankruptcies and their
progeny. Because expedited proceedings are vulnerable to error, some courts
have interpreted § 363(m) to allow relief when such relief would not sacrifice
finality. Capitalizing on such a balance, Part III suggests an equitable approach
to due process, which weighs the interests of a successful reorganization and of
the creditors to ensure both parties are protected before a sale is authorized, to
avoid undermining the finality of sales.
I. SECTION 363 SALES
Section 363 sales offer great advantages but have less protection for
creditors than the plan process. The procedure relies heavily on the debtor’s
judgment to assess the exigency of the situation, and puts creditors at a
disadvantage because they must act quickly, despite an informational
disadvantage, to successfully object to a motion for sale. Once a court
authorizes the sale, creditors have very limited opportunity for redress because
mootness operates to protect good faith buyers and foreclose appeals. Though
8

See infra Part I.B.
Ira L. Herman, Finality Through Mootness: Protecting Capital Providers in Bankruptcy Cases., ASSET
SALES COMM. NEWSLETTER, Apr. 2007, at 7, available at www.abiworld.org/committees/newsletters/
assetsales/vol4num2/AssetSales.pdf (citing Mission Iowa Wind Co. v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp.), 291
B.R. 39 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)).
9
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a party might seek a stay pending appeal, the court that approved an exigent
sale is unlikely to grant the extraordinary remedy.
A. Section 363 Sale Advantages & Disadvantages
1. Advantages: Section 363 Provides an Efficient Transfer of Assets
Mechanism
Section 363 sales provide debtors a valuable and flexible tool. The option
provides debtors the ability to quickly dispose of a rapidly depreciating asset,
liquidate the estate expediently, and complete the sale without a lengthy
chapter 11 reorganization plan.10 The sales promote more efficient markets
than liquidation.11 The sales provide benefits to debtors by allowing sales free
and clear of liens under § 363(f),12 allow protections from successor liability,
and have lower administrative costs than chapter 11.13 Section 363 may allow
actions that would normally not get confirmation as a chapter 11 plan or get
shareholders’ approval outside of bankruptcy.14 One of the most significant
10

3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 363.02 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds.,16th ed. 2011).
See In re Gulf Coast Oil Corp., 404 B.R. at 407, 424 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009) (“The principal
justification for § 363(b) sales is that aggressive marketing in an active market assures that the estate will
receive maximum benefit.”); Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L.
REV. 751 (2002); Jason Berge, An Efficiency Model of Section 363(b) Sales, 92 VA. L. REV. 1639 (2006).
Contra Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Bankruptcy Fire Sales, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1, 24 (2007)
(providing empirical evidence that judicially-based valuations are more accurate (based on post-reorganization
trading values) than valuations in bidding).
12 11 U.S.C. § 363(f). The section allows such sales provided one of the following: (1) applicable
nonbankruptcy law permits; (2) the entity consents; (3) the price of the property to be sold is greater than the
aggregate value of all the liens on the property; (4) a bona fide dispute; or (5) the entity could be compelled in
a legal or equitable proceeding to accept money satisfaction. Id. This Comment focuses on § 363(b), and will
not discuss the breadth of a purchaser’s ability to acquire assets without any accompanying liabilities. See, e.g.,
Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. Knupfer (In re PW, LLC), 391 B.R. 25, 37–47 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2008)
(discussing statutory interpretation of § 363(f); see also Lee R. Bogdanoff, The Purchase and Sale of Assets in
Reorganization Cases-of Interest and Principal, of Principles and Interests, 47 BUS. LAW. 1367, 1399–1425
(1992).
13 Joseph J. Wielebinski, et al., Recurrent and Developing Issues Encountered in Sales Pursuant to
Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code, ADVANCED BUSINESS BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE, MAY 1–2, 2008,
AUSTIN, TEXAS, CHAPTER 2, at 1, available at www.munsch.com/files/1610223_1.pdf. The 2005 amendments
added more procedural hurdles to chapter 11 plans, making § 363 sales more attractive. See Daniel P. Winikka,
The Declining Use of Chapter 11 as a Reorganization Tool, in BANKRUPTCY AND RESTRUCTURING CHAPTER
11 STRATEGIES 2009: TOP LAWYERS ON TRENDS AND KEY STRATEGIES FOR THE UPCOMING YEAR, 1 (Aspatore
Thought Leadership ed., 2009).
14 Miami Ctr. Ltd. P’ship. v. Bank of N.Y., 838 F. 2d 1547, 1553 (11th Cir. 1998). But see Craig A.
Sloane, The Sub Rosa Plan of Reorganization: Side-Stepping Creditor Protections in Chapter 11, 16 BANKR.
DEV. J. 37, 62 (1999) (arguing a debtor should not be able to consummate a transaction which would not be
approved under the plan provisions of chapter 11).
11
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advantages of the sales is § 363(m), which statutorily moots appeals of § 363
sales.15
A quick resolution in bankruptcy offers advantages not only to the debtor,
but also to the creditors and the national economy. Free of inefficiently
deployed assets, a debtor can devote its newly obtained cash and energies to its
future operations.16 The sales avoid the potentially less efficient results that
would be achieved through the bargaining and litigation of plan confirmation.17
The buyer, who values the debtor’s assets, will deploy them at a lower cost and
with greater economic output.18 Creditors forego the administrative costs of
confirming a plan and, assuming a market auction for the assets sold, a fair
return on their claims.19 The national economy benefits from the continued
existence of the debtor as an employer and output producer, more efficient
deployment of resources, and less burden on bankruptcy courts.20
The Lehman Brothers bankruptcy demonstrated the necessity for the
flexible, quick solution of § 363 sales. In 2008, facing the height of a financial
crisis, Lehman had no more cash: after borrowing heavily from risky shortterm financing, there were no more lenders, Lehman could not find a buyer,
and the U.S. government denied the company federal bailout funds.21 Lehman
had no choice but to file chapter 11.22 Barclay’s immediately stepped in as a
willing buyer.23 Lehman’s Chief Operating Officer testified that if the sale
were not approved immediately, the company would likely disappear as a

15

Infra Part II.B.
Robert G. Hansen & Randall S. Thomas, Auctions in Bankruptcy: Theoretical Analysis and Practical
Guidance, 18 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 159, 164 (1998).
17 Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations, 101 HARV. L. REV. 775, 777–
81 (1988); see also Harvey R. Miller, Chapter 11 Reorganization Cases and the Delaware Myth, 55 VAND. L.
REV. 1987 (2002) (arguing that creditors have more leverage in plan confirmation negotiations).
18 Robert G. Hansen & Randall S. Thomas, Auctions in Bankruptcy: Theoretical Analysis and Practical
Guidance, 18 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 159, 164 (1998) (arguing that ownership shifts from the bankrupt, or
inefficient, firms, to more efficient users of those goods).
19 See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 11, at 786–87 (discussing the efficiency of going-concern sales in
auctions).
20 Bebchuk, supra note 17, at 777–81.
21 Bay Harbour Mgmt., Ltd. Corp. v. Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc. (In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc.),
415 B.R. 77, 79 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
22 Id. at 80–81. The court’s approval pivoted on avoiding potential losses in the hundreds of billions of
dollars. Barclay’s Mem. in Opposition to the Rule 60 Motions and in Supp. to Enforce the Sale Order and
Secure Delivery of Undelivered Assets, Bay Harbour Mgmt., Ltd. Corp. v. Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc. (In re
Lehman Bros. Holding, Inc.), 415 B.R. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (Nos. 08-13555 (JMP), 08-01420 (JMP)), 2010
WL 390937 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2010).
23 Lehman Bros., 415 B.R. at 80.
16
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going concern.24 Before approving the expedited procedure, the court
addressed the due process issues, noting that heavy media coverage of
Lehman’s bankruptcy proceedings served as ample notice to creditors to act to
protect their rights.25 The case represented the archetypical “melting ice cube”
situation for which § 363(b) was intended: when the value of the debtor’s
assets is certain to decrease in the future.26 The size of the assets for sale was
so large that there would unlikely be another interested buyer.27 Without cash,
the company could not continue operations; the only alternative to the sale was
immediate liquidation, which would elicit fewer funds for the estate and
decrease overall economic output.28
2. Disadvantages: Section 363 Provide Creditors Less Protection than a
Plan
The economic benefits of debtors quickly reorganizing are counteracted by
the potential harms of creditors unwilling to lend because of the threat that
speedy bankruptcies will bypass their rights. Weary of a bankruptcy system
that sacrifices creditors’ rights at the first sign of the debtor’s imminent failure,
creditors will stop lending to companies that exhibit any risk of bankruptcy.29

24

Id.
Id.
26 See Fred N. David, Interpreting the Supreme Court’s Treatment of the Chrysler Bankruptcy and Its
Impact on Future Business Reorganizations, 27 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 25, 36 (2010) (discussing Ind. State
Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC (In re Chrysler LLC), 576 F.3d 108, 111 (2d Cir. 2009), aff’d, 556 U.S.
960, 960 (2009), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 1015 (2009), remanded, 592 F.3d 370 (2d Cir. 2010)).
27 In re Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc., 445 B.R. 143, 180 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part, sub nom. Barclays Capital, Inc. v. Giddens (In re Lehman Bros., Inc.), Nos. 11 Civ. 6052(KBF), 11 Civ.
6053(KBF), 2012 WL 2918675, at *23 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2012) (reversed as to the assets to which Barclay’s
was entitled).
28 Id. But see Joseph N. Argentina Jr. & Andrew C. Kassner, The Fog of War, Bankruptcy Sales: Urgent
Circumstances Help Preserve Bankruptcy Sales Despite Deficiencies, 243 THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER 83
(Apr. 29, 2011) (expressing doubt that the sale would have been approved but for the poor economic
conditions).
29 Barry E. Adler, A Reassessment of Bankruptcy Reorganization After Chrysler and General Motors, 18
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 305, 315–16 & n.13 (2010) (suggesting that accepting these cases as precedential
could increase the cost of capital, but acknowledging that empirical evidence to support this theory does not
exist); Mark J. Roe & David Skeel, Assessing the Chrysler Bankruptcy, 108 MICH. L. REV. 727, 771 (2010)
(“These are neither small nor simply fairness-based considerations: capital markets depend on effective
mechanisms that prevent financial majorities from ousting financial minorities from their ratable position in an
enterprise. That’s what’s at stake.”); see also Brief for Washington Legal Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner, Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC, 130 S. Ct. 1015 (2009) (No. 09-285),
2009 WL 3263076, at *7 (“Absent clearly defined limits on the use of Section 363 sales to strip creditors of
their security interests, the credit markets will dry up amidst investor uncertainty.”).
25
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Criticisms of § 363 include the vast power afforded to large creditors
and/or existing management,30 the potential for “sweetheart deals,”31 less
required disclosure than reorganization plans,32 and the circumvention of the
creditor committees and their interests.33 Although reorganizations often entail
lengthy confirmation processes, the procedures to approve chapter 11 plans
protect creditors’ rights and ensure the sanctity of bankruptcy proceedings.34
Although a debtor may sell substantially all of its assets through a
reorganization plan under § 1123(b)(4),35 most practitioners prefer § 363 sales
because of the reduced time and cost.36 In a § 363 sale, a buyer holds more
leverage than the debtor, since reorganization depends on consummation of the
sale.37
Since urgent sales often necessitate abbreviated notice, creditors have less
time to process less information. For a plan, disclosure statements lengthen the
process of confirming a plan but give creditors thorough information,38
pursuant to the Code’s mandate of “adequate information.”39 Disclosures for a
§ 363 sale need only contain a description of the property40 and nothing more,
not even the reason for the urgent sale.41
30 LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION FOR BIG BANKRUPTCY CASES IS
CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS 167–80 (2005).
31 See Elizabeth B. Rose, Comment, Chocolate, Flowers, and § 363(b):The Opportunity for Sweetheart
Deals Without Chapter 11 Protections, 23 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 249, 275–83 (2006).
32 See id. at 277–80.
33 George W. Kuney, Hijacking Chapter 11, 21 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 19, 106 (2004). But see Baird &
Rasmussen, supra note 11 (arguing that reorganizations will be displaced by 363 sales because of their
efficiency).
34 In re Bombay Co., No. 07-44084-RFN-11, 2007 WL 2826071, at *3 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2007)
(noting its preference for chapter 11, but if it is not used, creditors should at least be afforded the luxury of
sufficient time to assess fully the proposed transaction).
35 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(4) (2006). This provision allows liquidation through chapter 11. 7 COLLIER, supra
note 10, ¶ 1123.02[4].
36 Robert M. Fishman & Gordon E. Gouveia, What’s Driving Section 363 Sales After Chrysler and
General Motors, 19 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 4 Art. 2 (2010), available at Westlaw, 19 J. Bankr. L. & Prac. 4 Art.
2.
37 See Daniel J. Bussel & Kenneth N. Klee, Recalibrating Consent in Bankruptcy, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J.
663, 731 (2009); cf. Miller, supra note 17 (arguing that chapter 11 is no longer an even playing field between
debtors and creditors).
38 See Elizabeth B. Rose, supra note 31, at 282–83 (2006) (discussing the difference in disclosure
requirements between 363 and chapter 11 reorganization plans).
39 11 U.S.C. § 1125; see also George W. Kuney, Let’s Make It Official: Adding an Explicit Preplan Sale
Process as an Alternative Exit from Bankruptcy, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 1265, 1290–93 (2004). However, most
courts have local rules on what should be included in the motions and notice. Douglas E. Deutsch & Adam G.
Landis, An Introduction to Local Bankruptcy Rules, AM. BANKR. INST. J., June 2009, at 55, 72.
40 FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002(c)(1).
41 COLLIER, supra note 10, ¶ 363.02[1].
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Section 363 sales should only provide for the transfer of assets and not
dictate the terms of reorganization that would be determined by a
reorganization plan.42 Courts call a plan disguised as a sale a “sub rosa plan.”43
Allowing a sale to stipulate the terms of reorganization would “short circuit the
plan,” without giving creditors the same opportunity as in a plan to protect
their rights.44 For instance, all plan confirmations require that the plan treat
creditors “fair[ly] and equitabl[y]” and not unfairly discriminate against
them.45 The plan confirmation process offers creditors more time to air
grievances and negotiate with the DIP. The imbalance of power of a creditor
acting as a purchaser compounds the sale’s resemblance to a plan because a
buyer-creditor gets extensive leverage in setting the terms of the sale as well as
stalking horse bidder protections.46 Stalking horse bidders get benefits for
attracting other bidders and setting a bid floor, but these benefits should not be
so great as to deter prospective buyers.47 Bidding procedures that provide the
buyer (a creditor) significant benefits at the expense of other creditors would
violate protections afforded in plan confirmation.48
3. Sales Procedures
Courts generally take a supervisory role in § 363 sale procedures—
deferring to market principles and the debtor’s business judgment. Federal
Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure (the “Rules” or “Rule”) 6004 dictates the
procedure for § 363 sales.49 Often, the sale authorization process has two
stages: the court approves the sale and the bidding procedures, and once the

42 Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Brainiff Airways, Inc. (In re Brainiff Airways, Inc.), 700 F.2d 935, 940
(5th Cir. 1983).
43 Id.
44 See In re Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 495 (citing Brainiff Airways, 700 F.2d at 940). But see
Ralph Brubaker & Charles Jordan Tabb, Bankruptcy Reorganizations and the Troubling Legacy of Chrysler
and GM, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1375 (arguing Chrysler and GM effectively stripped the sub rosa doctrine of
any meaning).
45 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (2006).
46 Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, Is Chapter 11 Bankrupt?, 47 B.C. L. REV. 129, 154 (2005)
(explaining that DIP financing is increasingly common because debtors have large amounts of secured debt).
Because of this, pre-bankruptcy secured creditors have greater leverage to impose severe covenants and
conditions on the debtors and its activities. Id.
47 See Robert J. Keach, Stalking-Horse Lenders and Good Faith: The Availability of Appellate Protection
Under §§ 363(m) and 364(e) for Asset Purchasers Extending DIP Financing, AM. BANKR. INST. J., June 2004,
at 28, 58.
48 See Roe & Skeel, supra note 29, at 755.
49 10 COLLIER, supra note 10, ¶ 6004.01.
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auction is complete, the court approves the purchaser.50 Sometimes, the court
approves a single buyer and there is no auction.51 When there is an auction,
many judges believe they should have limited or no involvement because they
believe an auction results in a more accurate valuation without a judge’s
intervention.52 A debtor often negotiates bidding and sale procedures with a
stalking horse bidder.53 The initial stalking horse bid is always subject to better
offers.54 Courts defer to the business judgment of the debtor’s management
when approving bidding procedures and the best offer.55 The best offer need
not be the highest, but the DIP must have a compelling reason for why a lower
offer is superior to the highest.56 When there is only one bidder, judges have
little option but to conclude that the proposed sale is the highest and best.57
When approving a lone bidder or the bidding procedures for an auction, the
court must also approve the manner by which creditors will be notified of the
sale.58 Section 102(1)(A) provides that notice is required as “appropriate in the
particular circumstances.”59 Rule 6004, which governs the § 363 sale
procedure, incorporates the notice procedures of Rule 2002.60 Rule 2002

50 Jonathan Friedland & James H.M. Sprayregen, The Legal Considerations of Acquiring Distressed
Businesses: A Primer, 11 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 3 Art. 8 (2001), available at Westlaw 11 J. Bankr. L. & Prac. 3
Art. 8.
51 Id. at 13.
52 Id. at 9–10; see also H.R. REP. NO. 95–595, at 227 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
6186–87 (explaining that judicial valuations are a disfavored process).
53 A stalking horse bidder is the bidder who the debtor chooses to make the first bid. The most common
protection is a break-up fee. Michael Sirota & Felice Yudkin, Litigation Concerning the Use, Sale, or Lease of
Estate Property Other than Cash Collateral, in COMM. BANKR. LITIG. § 7:5 (Jonathan P. Friedland ed., 2011).
54 Frank B. Reilly, Jr. & David N. Crapo, Distressed M&A: Bankruptcy Code Section 363 Sales, PRATT’S
J. BANKR. L., Apr. 2009, available at Westlaw, JBKRL 2009.04-1.
55 See H.R. REP. NO. 95–595, at 227, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6186–87 (explaining that judicial valuations
are a disfavored process); see also, e.g., In re Borders Grp., Inc., 453 B.R. 477, 482–83 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2011); In re Bombay Co., No. 07-44084-RFN-11, 2007 WL 2826071, at *4 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2007);
In re 995 Fifth Ave. Assocs., L.P., 96 B.R. 24, 28 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989).
56 Borders Grp., 453 B.R. at 482–83 (citing In re Gulf States Steel, Inc., 285 B.R. 497, 516 (Bankr. N.D.
Ala. 2002)) (holding that courts defer to a debtor’s business judgment when selecting the highest and best
bids); see also In re Dewey Ranch Hockey, L.L.C., 406 B.R. 30, 40 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2009) (holding the debtor
could purchase one bidder over another because of its interest in maintaining the team’s location).
57 COMM. ON BANKR. AND CORPORATE REORGANIZATION, N.Y.C. BAR, CORPORATE BANKRUPTCIES:
TRENDS IN ASSET SALES AND LIQUIDATIONS (2010), available at http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/
20071875-CorporateBankruptciesTrendsinAssetSalesandLiquidations.pdf; see also In re Virteous Steel Prods.
Co., 911 F.2d 1223, 1232–33 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding the bankruptcy court’s balancing between the need to
wait for the “best offer” and need to stop future losses was not unreasonable).
58 COLLIER, supra note 10, ¶ 363.02[1].
59 11 U.S.C. § 102(1)(A) (2006).
60 10 COLLIER, supra note 10, ¶ 6004.01.
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requires twenty-one days’ notice, unless shortened for cause shown.61 No court
can grant any relief within twenty-one days of the filing of a petition, unless
necessary “to avoid immediate and irreparable harm.”62
Section 102 authorizes action without a hearing if no party-in-interest
timely requests one.63 Courts usually infer from a lack of objections that a sale
may proceed without a hearing.64 The short time between a proposed sale and
authorization can leave a creditor little time to formulate a meaningful
objection to counter the debtor’s extensively prepared argument for the sale’s
dire need.65 Disorganized creditors’ committees or smaller creditors with less
sophisticated counsel suffer from disadvantages in formulating objections: they
have less information, less time, and possibly a geographic barrier.66 A party
may object to a sale order, but must do so at least seven days before the court
hears a motion for sale.67 Objections might allege that the purchase price is
suboptimal, that the purchase price does not provide adequate protection under
§ 363(e),68 collusion under § 363(n), 69 or that the sale constitutes a sub rosa
plan.70
61 FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002(a)(2). Judges have discretion to shorten notice requirements per Rule
9006(c)(1). Id. 9006(c)(1). See infra Part II.D.4.a.
62 FED. R. BANKR. P. 6003. Subsection (b) enumerates § 363 sales as being governed by the rule. Id.
6003(b).
63 11 U.S.C. § 102; see also COLLIER, supra note 10, ¶ 363.02 (citing In re Robert L. Hallamore Corp.,
40 B.R. 181, 182–83 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984) (explaining that the 1978 Amendments allowed sales without
court approval under Rule 2002 and 6004)).
64 COLLIER, supra note 10, ¶ 363.02 [1][a]. But see In re Bombay Co., No. 07-44084-RFN-11, 2007 WL
2826071, at *4 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2007) (noting that even though there were some objectors, the
court was not satisfied that all potential objectors had the opportunity to voice their objections); In re Naron &
Wagner, Chartered, 88 B.R. 85, 89 (Bankr. D. Md. 1988) (holding a second round of notice statements as
adequately notifying creditors in lieu of chapter 11 organization disclosure).
65 See Christopher W. Frost, Running the Asylum: Governance Problems in Bankruptcy Reorganizations,
34 ARIZ. L. REV. 89, 128–29 (1992) (explaining that judges only get a one-sided version of the facts when
parties do not have an opportunity for fact finding); see also infra Part II.C (discussing that in GM the court
worked through 850 objections in just three days); cf. Rose, supra note 31, at 262.
66 Because of the Code’s venue provisions, debtors have wide latitude on where to file. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1408. For discussion on the topic of forum shopping generally, see generally Theodore Eisenberg & Lynn
M. LoPucki, Shopping for Judges: An Empirical Analysis of Venue Choice in Large Chapter 11
Reorganizations, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 967 (1999); William C. Whitford, Venue Choice: Where the Action Is,
54 BUFF. L. REV. 321 (2006); Todd J. Zywicki, Is Forum Shopping Corrupting America’s Bankruptcy Courts?,
94 GEO. L.J. 1141 (2006).
67 The court may also fix a different time for objections. FED. R. BANKR. P. 6004(b). While a hearing
date is not necessary if there are no objections, the notice should set a court date. 10 COLLIER, supra note 10,
¶ 6004.01.
68 11 U.S.C. § 363(e). If an objection alleges inadequate protection, the burden of proof rests on the
trustee. Id. § 363(p). To determine whether a price is inadequate, a creditor may need to spend a significant
amount of money for an independent valuation. A fair market sales procedure is usually enough proof of
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If there are no objections, the sale may also proceed without court
authorization, but buyers usually request a court order for the sale with an
explicit finding of good faith.71 The term “good faith” has no definition in the
Code.72 Most courts require a finding that the party who acquired the property
was (a) in good faith, as per the traditional definition of not in bad faith, (b) for
value, and (c) without knowledge of adverse claims.73 Section 363(m)
explicitly protects good faith buyers; thus, many sale orders state that the
purchaser meets the good faith standard of § 363(m).74
Once a court authorizes a sale, Rule 6004(h) provides an automatic
fourteen-day stay before sale consummation, but the Rule grants the judge
discretion to shorten or eliminate the stay. 75 In theory, the Rule aimed to avoid
the race to court between a creditor (seeking to stop the sale) and a seller
(seeking quick approval and mootness protection).76 In practice, courts almost
always eliminate the stay in light of the debtor’s push to complete the sale
quickly.77 As discussed below, a stay pending appeal is an extraordinary
remedy, and parties are unlikely to succeed on a motion for one.78

adequate protection. LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 11, at 38. The movant also bears the burden to prove “the
issue of the validity, priority, or extent of such interest.” 11 U.S.C. § 363(p)(2).
69 Id. § 363(n).
70 See supra text accompanying notes 42–45.
71 COLLIER, supra note 10, ¶ 363.02.
72 See Made in Detroit, Inc. v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Made in Detroit, Inc. (In re
Made in Detroit, Inc.), 414 F.3d 576, 581 (6th Cir. 2005) (explaining that the traditional definition is circular
because it provides that a good faith purchaser is one who purchases assets for value in good faith). Typical
actions that denote bad faith are fraud, collusion, or an attempt to take grossly unfair advantage of other
creditors. See id.
73 See, e.g., T.C. Investors v. Joseph (In re M Capital Corp.), 290 B.R. 743, 746 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2003);
Willemain v. Kivitz, 764 F.2d 1019, 1023 (4th Cir. 1985) (quoting In re Rock Indus. Mach. Corp., 572 F.2d
1195, 1197 (7th Cir. 1978)).
74 E.g., General Order M-383, U.S. BANKR. COURT S. DIST. N.Y., http://www.nysb.uscourts.gov/orders/
m383.pdf (last visited Nov. 4, 2012); Guidelines Re Sale Orders, U.S. BANKR. COURT N. DIST. CAL., http://
www.canb.uscourts.gov/procedures/dist/guidelines/order-re-sale-orders (last visited Nov. 4, 2012); Bob
Eisenbach, Delaware Bankruptcy Court Adopts New Local Rule for Section 363 Sales, IN THE (RED): THE
BUSINESS BANKRUPTCY BLOG, http://bankruptcy.cooley.com/2008/02/articles/business-bankruptcy-issues/
delaware-bankruptcy-court-adopts-new-local-rule-for-section-363-sales/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2012).
75 FED. R. BANKR. P. 6004(h).
76 COLLIER, supra note 10, ¶ 363.11.
77 Josef S. Athanas, Section 363 Bankruptcy Sales Attacked by Judges and Commentators Just as
Economic Conditions Make Them More Important Than Ever, in BANKRUPTCY AND RESTRUCTURING
CHAPTER 11 STRATEGIES 2009: TOP LAWYERS ON TRENDS AND KEY STRATEGIES FOR THE UPCOMING YEAR, 1
(Aspatore Thought Leadership ed., 2009)..
78 Infra Part I.C.
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B. Mootness
Section 363(m) sets a seemingly clear standard that no asset can be taken
back from a good faith purchaser, regardless of other equitable concerns. The
statute reads:
The reversal or modification on appeal of an authorization under
subsection (b) or (c) of this section of a sale or lease of property does
not affect the validity of a sale or lease under such authorization to an
entity that purchased or leased such property in good faith, whether
or not such entity knew of the pendency of the appeal, unless such
79
authorization and such sale or lease were stayed pending appeal.

The provision furthers the goal of finality by protecting good faith buyers.80
The reverence for finality predates the Code.81 All courts agree on the
importance of this interest, but disagree on whether there are exceptions to this
statutory mootness provision.82
The plain meaning of § 363(m) protects only good faith buyers from
appeals challenging the validity of the buyer’s title. Though the statute allows
an appeal if a stay was obtained, courts disagree on whether this provision bars
all appeals absent a stay or allows exceptions when an appeal would not
modify “the validity of the sale.”83 Some courts broadly interpret that
reopening any part of the sale order on which the buyer relied would disturb
the validity of the sale.84 However, some courts specify that relief from parties
other than the good faith buyer is possible if the validity of the sale would not

79

11 U.S.C. § 363(m) (2006).
Vlasek v. Levey (In re Vlasek), 325 F.3d 955, 961 (7th Cir. 2003); Cinicola v. Scharffenberger, 248
F.3d 110, 1121–22 (3d Cir. 2001); Boullioun Aircraft Holding Co. v. Smith Mgmt. (In re W. Pac. Airlines,
Inc.), 181 F.3d 1191, 1195 (10th Cir. 1999); In re Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc., 445 B.R. 143, 181 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing United States v. Salerno, 932 F.2d 117, 123 (2d Cir. 1991)), aff’d in part, rev’d in part,
sub nom. Barclays Capital Inc. v. Giddens (In re Lehman Bros., Inc.), 473 B.R. 34 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); GAF
Holdings, L.L.C. v. Rinaldi (In re Farmland Indus., Inc.), 408 B.R. 497, 508 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2009) (citing
Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Trism, Inc. (In re Trism, Inc.), 328 F.3d 1003, 1006 (8th Cir.
2003)), aff’d, 639 F.3d 402 (8th Cir. 2011).
81 H.R. REP. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt.1, 100 n.26 (1973) (quoting Ex parte Christy, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 292,
312 (1845)).
82 See infra Part II.C.
83 Compare Krebs Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Valley Motors, Inc., 141 F.3d 490, 499 (3d Cir. 1998),
with Cincinnati Microwave, Inc. v. Baldiga (In re Whistler Corp. of Mass.), 243 B.R. 573, 575 (D. Mass.
2000) (rejecting a validity of the sale exception).
84 But see In re Cont’l Airlines, 91 F.3d 553, 572 (3d Cir. 1996) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“The mere act of
entertaining that claim would not imperil Continental’s reorganization or impair any legitimate reliance
interests.”).
80
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be disturbed.85 One bankruptcy appellate panel held that § 363(m) only
protects sales under subsections (b) and (c).86 Most courts reject this
interpretation because sales under subsections (b) and (c) rely on the other
subsections of § 363.87
Once an appeal is declared moot, the court will never consider the merits of
an appellant’s motion. Statutory mootness precludes appeals regardless of
whether there is still a live controversy.88 In any bankruptcy case, relief on
appeal is especially tricky because of the limited ability for relief.89 When there
is no equitable relief possible in a bankruptcy matter, courts may declare the
issue equitably moot.90 Most courts adopt a multi-part test to determine
whether equitable mootness applies,91 with substantial consummation92 as the
foremost factor.93 In § 363 sales, consummation is more direct than in a plan:
once a court authorizes a sale, the only remedy is to take back the assets from

85

Salerno, 932 F.2d at 123 (holding that while an appeal concerning a sale order was moot, appellant
was free to object to the distribution of the proceeds).
86 Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. Knupfer (In re PW, L.L.C.), 391 B.R. 25, 35–36 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
2008); see infra Part II.C.3.
87 Official Comms. of Unsecured Creditors v. Anderson Senior Living Prop., L.L.C. (In re Nashville
Senior Living, L.L.C.), 407 B.R. 222, 228 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2009) (“Clear Channel appears to be an aberration
in well-settled bankruptcy jurisprudence applying § 363(m) to the ‘free and clear’ aspect of a sale under
§ 363(f).”).
88 Constitutional mootness requires that an actual controversy exist at all times throughout litigation.
Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653 (1895); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES
AND POLICIES 160 (3d ed. 2006). Equitable mootness, like statutory mootness, may moot still live
controversies. See Cont’l Airlines, 91 F.3d at 569 (calling the doctrine of equitable mootness a misnomer
because it considers equities rather than the controversies).
89 In re UNR Indus., Inc., 20 F.3d 766, 769 (7th Cir. 1994).
90 See Nordhoff Inv., Inc. v. Zenith Elecs. Corp., 258 F.3d 180, 185 (3d Cir. 2001); see generally
Matthew D. Pechous, Comment, Walking the Tight Rope and Not the Plank: A Proposed Standard for SecondLevel Appellate Review of Equitable Mootness Determinations, 28 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 547 (2012)
(outlining the standards of review used by courts on appeal—de novo or abuse of discretion).
91 These factors are: (1) Whether a stay has been sought or obtained; (2) whether the plan has been
substantially consummated; (3) whether the relief requested would affect the rights of third parties; (4) whether
the relief requested would affect the success of the confirmed plan; and (5) the public policy of affording
finality to bankruptcy judgments. Search Mkt. Direct, Inc. v. Jubber (In re Paige), 584 F.3d 1327, 1338 (10th
Cir. 2009) (internal citation omitted). For a discussion for the various approaches and variations of this test,
see Caroline L. Rosiek, Note, Making Equitable Mootness Equal: The Need for a Uniform Approach to
Appeals in the Context of Bankruptcy Reorganization Plans, 57 SYRACUSE L. REV. 685, 697–704 (2007).
92 The Code elsewhere defines substantial consummation as the “(A) transfer of all or substantially all of
the property proposed by the plan to be transferred; (B) assumption by the debtor or by the successor to the
debtor under the plan of the business or of the management of all or substantially all of the property dealt with
by the plan; and (C) commencement of distribution under the plan.” 11 U.S.C. § 1101(2) (2006).
93 Nordhoff, 258 F.3d at 185 (quoting In re PWS Holding Corp., 228 F.3d 224, 236 (3d Cir. 2000)).
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the buyer.94 Although obtaining a stay pending appeal prevents the sale from
consummating and preserves the right to appeal, doing so can prove
challenging in the backdrop of a debtor urging a quick sale.
C. Stay Pending Appeal
The right to appeal is not an absolute right—it is subject to a concern for
finality.95 The court of appeals, bankruptcy appellate panel (if existent), district
court, or bankruptcy court may hear appeals from final bankruptcy
judgments.96 A party may motion directly to a higher court to hear an appeal
only if such motion shows why relief was not obtained from the bankruptcy
court.97 A party has fourteen days from the entry of judgment to file a notice of
appeal.98 While other federal appeals allow thirty days,99 bankruptcy appeals
are allowed less time to prevent delays in the administration of the case.100
Filing an appeal does not itself halt any order of the court; a stay pending
appeal is necessary.101
Convincing the court to delay an authorized transaction with a stay pending
appeal requires the movant to meet a heavy burden.102 A stay pending appeal is
similar to a preliminary injunction;103 it is an extraordinary remedy at the
court’s discretion.104 Rule 8005 governs the procedure for obtaining a stay
pending appeal.105 A movant must be able to provide a supersedeas bond.106
94

Frito-Lay Co. v. LTV Steel Co. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 10 F.3d 944, 952–53 (2d Cir. 1993); see
also UNR Indus., 20 F.3d at 769 (discussing the inability to “unscramble an egg”).
95 John P. Hennignan, Toward Regularizing Appealability in Bankruptcy, 12 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J.
583, 584, 588–89 (1996).
96 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A). In 2005, Congress added this option to allow a party to appeal directly to the
court of appeals. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. no. 109-8,
§ 1233, 119 Stat. 23, 202–04 (2005).
97 FED. R. BANKR. P. 8005.
98 Id. 8002(a).
99 FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)(A).
100 FED. R. BANKR. P. 8002, advisory committee note.
101 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(D). The requirement for a stay pending appeal furthers the interest of finality by
preventing an authorized action from consummating when there is still a chance the authorized action will be
modified. Vlasek v. Levey (In re Vlasek), 325 F.3d 955, 961–62 (7th Cir. 2003).
102 In re Gen. Motors Corp., 409 B.R. 24, 30 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (citations omitted).
103 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE GUIDE ¶ 117.11 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer
eds.,16th ed. 2012) (citing Rockwell Int’l Corp. v, White Motor Corp. (In re White Motor Corp.), 25 B.R. 293,
297 (N.D. Ohio 1982)).
104 Edith H. Jones, Bankruptcy Appeals, 16 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 245, 269, 272 (1991) (citing Hartigan v.
Pine Lake Vill. Apartment Co. (In re Pine Lake Vill. Apartment Co.), 21 B.R. 395, 398 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)).
105 FED. R. BANKR. P. 8005. A motion for a stay pending appeal must be presented to a bankruptcy judge
in the first instance. Id.
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The bond makes it difficult to secure a stay, particularly for larger
transactions.107 However, if the appealing party does not prevail, payment of
the bond indemnifies the party whose action the stay pending appeal halts.108
Rule 8005 does not provide guidance on the criteria for consideration of a
stay pending appeal, nor does the Rule require the court to specify its
reasoning in a denial of a stay.109 Many courts have adopted a four-factor test
when considering a motion for a stay pending appeal:110
(1) Whether the appellant made a substantial showing of likelihood
to succeed on the merits on appeal;
(2) whether the appellant will suffer irreparable injury absent the
stay;
(3) whether a stay would substantially harm the other parties in the
litigation; and
111
(4) whether a stay is in the public interest.

There is significant variance among the courts as to how to weigh these
factors.112 The majority of courts hold that the movant bears the burden of
persuading the court on all the factors.113 Conversely, the minority says that
none of these factors are dispositive but are weighed against one and other.114

106 A party who cannot provide this bond has the additional requirement of showing why the bond should
deviate from the full amount. Richard S. Kanowitz & Michael A. Klein, The Divergent Interpretations of the
Standard Governing Motions for Stay Pending Appeal of Bankruptcy Court Orders, 17 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC.
Art. 3 (2008), available at Westlaw, 17 J. Bankr. L. & Prac. 4.
107 George W. Kuney, Slipping into Mootness, in NORTON ANNUAL SURVEY OF BANKRUPTCY LAWS, 2007
EDITION (2007). FED R. BANKR. P. 7062 incorporates FED. R. CIV. P. 62(d), which does not specify how to
calculate a bond amount, but courts have read in the requirements of the rule’s predecessor, to require some
proportion of the judgment remaining unsatisfied. Poplar Grove Planting & Refining Co. v. Bache Halsey
Stuart, Inc., 600 F.2d 1189, 1191 (5th Cir. 1979).
108 ACC Bondholder Grp. v. Adelphia Commc’ns Corp. (In re Adelphia Commc’ns Corp.), 361 B.R. 337,
368 n.167 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
109 Since a movant appealing the denial of a stay to a higher court must provide it, an applicant is
implicitly entitled to the court’s reasoning if it rejects a stay. 10 COLLIER, supra note 10, ¶ 8005.11.
110 E.g., In re Roth American, Inc., 90 B.R. 94, 95 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1988) (citing In re Fosko Markets,
Inc., 74 B.R. 384 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987)); In re Crescenzi, 58 B.R. 141, 143 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986); In re
Beker Indus. Corp., 57 B.R. 611, 632, 633 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986).
111 10 COLLIER, supra note 10, ¶ 8005.08.
112 Kanowitz & Klein, supra note 106.
113 E.g., Hertz Corp. v. ANC Rental Corp. (In re ANC Rental Corp.), No. 01-11220, 2002 WL 1058196,
at *2 (D. Del. May 22, 2002) (citing In re Blackwell, 162 B.R. 117, 120 (E.D. Pa. 1993)); Ohanian v. Irwin (In
re Irwin), 338 B.R. 839, 843 (E.D. Cal. 2006); In re Tower Automotive, Inc., No. 05-10578, 2006 WL
2583624, at *1 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006).
114 Adelphia, 361 B.R. at 347 (citing Mohammed v. Reno, 309 F.3d 95, 101 (2d Cir. 2002)); see also
Commonwealth Nat’l Bank v. Dobslaw (In re Dobslaw), 20 B.R. 922, 924 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982) (citing
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When considering these factors, bankruptcy courts face the difficult task of
weighing management’s assertions of a sale’s necessity against the fairness to
the creditor of barring an appeal.115 The first factor, likelihood to succeed on
the merits, is problematic. If a judge has used her discretion to authorize an
expedited § 363 sale, she believed it was necessary for the reorganization and
is unlikely to find that an appeal to the contrary would succeed.116 For the
second factor, irreparable injury, courts are split on whether the risk of
mootness itself constitutes irreparable injury.117 Most courts hold that
mootness does not constitute irreparable harm, since this threat exists in any
bankruptcy proceeding.118 In In re Adelphia, the Court for the Southern District
of New York adopted the minority view.119 The court reasoned that absent a
stay, the strong possibility of mooting an appeal of significant claims of error
constitutes irreparable harm.120 Denying a stay pending appeal ensures
meritorious claims “will never be heard on appeal due to mootness—a
quintessential form of prejudice—which will inevitably result from the
substantial consummation.”121 The Adelphia court found such prejudice greatly

Constructors Assoc. v. Kreps, 573 F.2d 811, 815 (3d. Cir. 1978)) aff’d sub nom. In re Ashe, 712 F.2d 864 (3d
Cir. 1983).
115 Russell A. Eisenberg & Frances Gecker, Due Process and Bankruptcy: A Contradiction in Terms?, 10
BANKR. DEV. J. 47, 62 (1993).
116 E.g., In re Gen. Credit Corp., 283 B.R. 658, 659–60 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); N. Am. Enters. v. Fincke (In re
Access Cardiosystems), 340 B.R. 656, 660 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2006); In re Deep, 288 B.R. 27, 30 (Bankr.
N.D.N.Y. 2003); Miraj & Sons, Inc., 201 B.R. 23, 26–27 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1996); In re Public. Serv. Co. of
N.H., 116 B.R. 347, 348–49 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1990); see also Kenneth S. Leonetti and & Euripides
Dalmanieras, Procedural Issues in Bankruptcy Appeals, 17 A.B.I. NORTHEAST BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE
AND NORTHEAST CONSUMER FORUM 195, 247, available at Westlaw, 070810 ABI-CLE 195 (citing
Albiococco v. Albiococco (In re Albicocco), No. 06-3409, 2006 WL 2620464, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 13,
2006)).
117 Country Squire Assocs., L.P. v. Rochester Cmty. Sav. Bank (In re Country Squire Assocs., L.P.), 203
B.R. 182, 183 n.1 (B.A.P. 2d Cir. 1996); Adelphia, 361 B.R. at 347–48 (citing cases in the Second Circuit
supporting the affirmative position in Daly v. St. Germain (In re Norwich Historic Pres. Trust, L.L.C.), No.
3:05CV12(MRK), 2005 WL 977067 (D. Conn. Apr. 21, 2005)); In re St. Johnsbury Trucking Co., 185 B.R.
687, 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); see also In re Herrera, 2010 WL 148182 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2010); In re
Gen. Motors Corp., 409 B.R. 24, 31 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (accepting the threat of equitable mootness is
enough to get on the “scoreboard”); Williams v. George Junior Republic (In re Cujas), 376 B.R. 480 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 2007).
118 See In re Baker, No. CV05-3487, 2005 WL 2105802, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2005) (“As other
courts have noted, the possibility that an appeal will be rendered moot by a denial of stay does not, in and of
itself, constitute irreparable harm.”); see also Sunflower Racing, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Racing & Gaming (In
re Sunflower Racing, Inc.), 223 B.R. 222, 225 (D. Kan.1998) (collecting cases).
119 Adelphia, 361 B.R. at 347–48.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 368.
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outweighed any financial harm from granting a stay pending appeal,
particularly since posting bond would ameliorate such financial harm.122
Courts often do not get to the consideration of the third and fourth factors
because the assessments of likelihood of success or irreparable harm are
compelling enough.123 Nonetheless, the third and fourth factors meld together
and skew against the movant. The approval of an urgent sale indicates that
delaying the sale would harm a debtor, particularly if an expectant buyer may
walk away when faced with a delay.124 The public interest lies with facilitating
an economically beneficial speedy reorganization that benefits the public,125
but courts rarely mention the public interest of protecting creditors.126
If a party fails to obtain a stay pending appeal for a sale order, § 363(m)
will quickly moot any chance for a remedy for an aggrieved creditor. In
considering a motion for stay pending appeal, the debtor’s interests in
reorganization outweigh the creditor’s grievances, yet the creditors have no
chance for further remediation once the motion is denied.
II. HOW THE DEBTOR’S EXIGENCY OUTWEIGHS THE CREDITORS’ DUE
PROCESS RIGHTS
In re Chrysler LLC and In re General Motors Corp. were cases in which
the need for speed proved weightier than concerns about the sale process and
creditor rights. Perhaps those situations merited the emergency treatment, but
the creditors could not appeal to a higher court their concerns that the sale
circumvented priorities, garnered them a sub-optimal return, or constituted a
sub rosa plan. A powerful party, the U.S. government, propelled the speedy
sale confirmations. Embracing a deferential standard that placed the debtors’
need for reorganization before meaningful due process, the courts paved the
122

Id.
Hunt v. Bankers Trust Co., 799 F.2d 1060, 1067 (5th Cir. 1986) (finding there was not a likelihood of
success on the merits); Rally Auto Grp., Inc. v. Gen. Motors LLC (In re Motors Liquidation Co.), No. M47(RPP), 2010 WL 4449425, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2010) (rejecting that the appellant would suffer
irreparable harm, so a stay is not in the public interest); In re McKenzie, No. A09-78963-PWB, 2009 WL
6499259, at *2 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Oct. 30, 2009) (finding that there was not substantial likelihood of success on
appeal); FFG-NJ Vehicle Funding Corp. v. Holtmeyer (In re Holtmeyer), 229 B.R. 579, 582–83 (E.D.N.Y.
1999) (finding the appeal was doomed to failure, and even if it was not, there would be no irreparable harm).
124 See infra Part II.A.2 (discussing the Chrysler and GM courts reliance on the buyer demands).
125 See e.g., In re Savage & Assoc., P.C., No. 05 CIV.2072 (SAS), 2005 WL 488643, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb
28, 2005) (“[P]ublic interest favors the expedient administration of the bankruptcy proceedings . . . .”); Va.
Dep’t of Med. Assistance Servs. v. Shenandoah Realty Partners, 248 B.R. 505, 515 (W.D. Va. 2000).
126 See Part I.A.2.
123
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road for impatient buyers to hold courts hostage to threats of compromising the
reorganization. Recognizing the potential unfairness to creditors, some courts
have injected a more equitable approach to § 363(m) by allowing appeals when
the court can fashion relief without compromising the principles of finality.
A. Chrysler & GM
The prominence and controversy surrounding the General Motors and
Chrysler bankruptcies garnered attention to the problems of expedited § 363
sales.127 Some criticisms focused on the judges favoring the goal of saving the
companies rather than the Code’s statutory goal of paying back the creditors.128
Though the U.S. government’s involvement in these cases seems
exceptional,129 the cases established influential precedent on what constitutes
the melting ice cube scenario that necessitates expedition,130 but focused little
on the minimum protections for creditors. 131
In Chrysler,132 the U.S. government exerted its hefty leverage on the debtor
and the court to get the sale done unprecedentedly quickly.133 In the sale
agreement, product liability claimants were cut off and the secured creditors’
priorities were ignored, in favor of retirees.134 Since the sales agreement
formed New Chrysler, some critics argued that Chrysler was not a sale at all,
but a hurried reorganization.135 Fiat was the asset buyer, but it had no money at
stake: the U.S. government provided financing for the deal.136 Since Fiat had
nothing to lose, it would never have walked away from the deal,137 but a drawn
out process was not in the interest of the U.S. government.138 After the sale’s
approval, the court denied the Indiana Pensioners’ request for a stay pending
127 Adler, supra note 29; E.g., Brubaker & Tabb, supra note 44; David, supra note 26; Roe & Skeel, supra
note 29.
128 Ashby Jones & Mike Spector, Creditors Cry Foul at Chrysler Precedent, WALL ST. J., June 13, 2009,
at B1.
129 Fishman & Gouveia, supra note 36.
130 See supra note 26.
131 See Bussel & Klee, supra note 37, at 666 (suggesting that “legitimacy was unduly sacrificed for
expediency” in these cases).
132 In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. 84, 89 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d sub nom. Ind. State Police Pension
Trust v. Chrysler LLC (In re Chrysler LLC), 576 F.3d 108, 111 (2d Cir. 2009), aff’d, 556 U.S. 960, 960
(2009), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 1015 (2009), remanded 592 F.3d 370 (2d Cir. 2010).
133 See Roe & Skeel, supra note 29, at 750.
134 Secured creditors only received $0.29 on the dollar. Id. at 730–33.
135 Id. at 759.
136 Chrysler, 405 B.R. at 90–92.
137 Roe & Skeel, supra note 29, at 750.
138 Id.
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appeal.139 The court cited the same reasoning that led it to approve the
emergency sale—the necessity of the sale for a successful reorganization—and
did not address the merits of the movants’ objections.140
Similarly, in GM, the court’s authorization order emphasized the threat to
the debtor of not consummating the sale quickly.141 The court noted that the
continuing loss of revenue and market share would have grave effects and the
sale had to go forward to avoid liquidation.142 Like in Chrysler, there was no
true market valuation of the assets sold.143 The sale took place too quickly and
bidding was restricted to bidders willing to accept the United Auto Workers’
liabilities as a condition of purchase.144 Although this pre-condition lowered
the sale value, the court said it was acceptable because the price was greater
than what the bidders would have received through liquidation.145
1. Exception or the Rule? The Impact of Chrysler and GM
Although these cases were exceptional, they set precedent for rushing
through sales and past procedural safeguards. Despite suggestions that
Chrysler and GM were exceptional bankruptcy situations,146 this Comment
argues that the rule of law must prevail even in the so-called exceptional case.
The Code grants judges discretion for these exceptional cases, within certain
parameters; these extraordinary cases, which curtail creditor protections, call
for sparse usage, not universal applicability.147
Arguing for the necessity of the expeditious sales, the debtors in both
Chrysler and GM did not give narrow emergency justifications, but rather
justifications difficult to distinguish from those present in all large
139

In re Chrysler LLC, No. 009-50002 AJG, 2009 WL 7386569, at *1 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 20, 2009).
The movants claimed that the order was not legal under title 11 and also questioned the
constitutionality of the sale. Id. at *3. The Supreme Court vacated the appeal as moot without the addressing
any issues of constitutionality. Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC (In re Chrysler LLC), 130 S.
Ct. 1015 (2009), remanded, 592 F.3d 370 (2d Cir. 2010).
141 See In re Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 485 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
142 Id. at 484; see also Debtors’ Motion to Approve the Sale at 5, In re Gen. Motors Corp., 409 B.R. 24
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 09-50026), 2009 WL 1529573.
143 Adler, supra note 29, at 312.
144 Id.
145 Gen. Motors, 407 B.R. at 485.
146 Stephen J. Lubben, No Big Deal: The GM and Chrysler Cases in Context, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 531,
531 (2009); see A. Joseph Warburton, Understanding the Bankruptcies of Chrysler and General Motors: A
Primer, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 531, 579 (2010) (outlining critics and supporters views of the two
bankruptcies).
147 See infra Part II.D.5.b.
140
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bankruptcies. In both cases, the courts relied on the fact that the financers
conditioned their commitment upon the consummation of the deal within a
short time frame.148 In Chrysler, the U.S. government set a sixty-day deadline
to resolve the bankruptcy, but it is unclear why this deadline was imperative.149
Chrysler argued that without assurance of the deal’s speedy consummation,
consumer confidence would decline and Chrysler would not be able to secure
its supplier or dealer networks.150 Its failure would lead to the loss of thousands
of jobs and have a domino effect within the auto industry because of Chrysler’s
prominence.151 Nonetheless, Chrysler did not provide evidence that the deal
could not be consummated without holding the judicial system hostage to an
expedited process.
Any financer can make demands based upon arbitrary deadlines. Most
buyers would prefer that a purchase close as soon as possible, particularly
since once that sale closes, the sale is enshrouded from appeal. It is difficult to
imagine any large bankruptcy that does not have grave impacts on employees,
distribution channels, and customers. The melting ice cube illustrated by these
cases imported mere speculative threats of harm—the impending threat of loss
of confidence and subsequent failure—as justification for expedition of rights.
These cases demonstrated the potential for abuse when there is one
powerful creditor—here, the U.S. government.152 A large creditor or
dominating force in an industry could also exert the imposing influence that
the government did in these cases.153 In Chrysler, a government-imposed
deadline propelled the court to work through 850 objections in three days.154
With little time to prepare their objections, and severely abridged time for
court consideration, creditor’s grievances unlikely received thorough
consideration. An expedited proceeding, where the balance of information and
control of reorganization heavily favors the debtor, provides ample opportunity
to cut off creditors with little power.155
148 Roe & Skeel, supra note 29, at 750 (explaining that the U.S. Treasury was simultaneously preparing
the GM deal and would unlikely walk if the deal was not approved on the June 15 deadline).
149 Id.
150 See Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Debtors and Debtors in Possession at 11–12, In re
Old Carco LLC, No. 09-50002, 2011 WL 2752222 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 2, 2011), 2009 WL 5131346.
151 See id. at 12–13.
152 Adler, supra note 29, at 315.
153 Cf. Brubaker & Tabb, supra note 44, at 1405–06.
154 Micheline Maynard, Automakers’ Swift Cases in Bankruptcy Shock Experts, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2009,
at B1.
155 See Roe & Skeel, supra note 29, at 763 (suggesting that the government does not need to be entity
providing the funding to exert its power).
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2. A Roadmap for Impatient Buyers
Recent cases from the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New
York demonstrate the precedential value Chrysler and GM had in allowing
buyers to demand a quick process.156 In In re GSC, the court relied on both GM
and Chrysler to approve a quick sale of all the debtor’s assets to Black
Diamond.157 In GSC, the court focused on the business justification for the
sale. Citing GM, the court reasoned that without the sale, the assets would lose
value and consumer confidence would decline.158 For GSC, the court
appointed a trustee to manage the reorganization and relied on the trustee’s
consideration and rejection of four alternative courses of actions before
pursuing the sale to Black Diamond.159 More troubling was the court’s
treatment of Black Diamond’s demands for the sale. The court approved the
quick sale because it reasoned that even if Black Diamond would have waited
through any delays, Black Diamond was unlikely to offer the same value in the
future because of the additional administrative costs.160 The court reasoned that
any delay would expose the company to the unnecessary risk of losing key
employees and diminishing investor confidence.161
By accepting a speculative threat of suboptimal results of GSC’s
reorganization, the court provided an instruction manual for impatient buyers
to hold the procedural protections of bankruptcy hostage. All reorganizations
benefit from speed,162 but the justification for expedition must weigh the rights
being abridged more heavily than a mere possibility of suboptimal
consequences from the lack of speed. If a debtor’s management has a preferred
buyer (the sale to whom flouts the best interests of the creditors), this
instruction manual could guide the demands a buyer should make to ensure a
speedy sale authorization.
The § 363 process heavily favors debtors; dissatisfied creditors must
produce very compelling evidence before their interests could counter the

156 E.g., In re GSC, Inc., 453 B.R. 132, 155 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011); In re Bos. Generating, LLC, 440
B.R. 302, 329 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Metaldyne Corp., 409 B.R. 671, 678 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009),
aff’d, 421 B.R. 620 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
157 GSC, Inc., 453 B.R. 132, 166 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011).
158 Id. (citing In re Gen. Motors, 407 B.R. 463, 492–93).
159 See id.
160 Id. at 166–67.
161 Id. at 169.
162 See supra Part I.A.1.
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debtor’s assertions. Unfair treatment would be curbed by imposing a more
rigid burden of evidence to speed past due process safeguards.163
B. Valid Business Purpose & Potential Conflicts of Interests
Historically, courts skeptical of sales outside of chapter 11 required a
showing of an emergency before approving a sale.164 Today, courts give more
deference to the reorganizing company’s management and only require a valid
business purpose for a sale.165
A valid business purpose is necessary for both the sale and not waiting for
a reorganization plan to complete the sale.166 In re Lionel gave rise to the valid
business purpose test, which recognized that while bankruptcy judges need
flexibility to fashion relief and facilitate successful reorganizations, flexibility
does not give debtors carte blanche to evade the Code.167 The valid business
purpose test listed non-exclusive factors for consideration of a sale motion:
proportionate value of assets to the whole business, amount of time elapsed
since the filing, likelihood a plan of reorganization will be proposed and
confirmed in the near future, effects of proposed disposition on future
reorganization, proceeds to be obtained, the § 363 method of disposition, and
whether the asset is increasing or decreasing in value.168 The Lionel factors
rely on the notion that the disposition of assets is an incremental step of the
plan process, not a means of disposing of the bankruptcy case altogether (as
§ 363 sales are commonly used now).169 Because of the transformation in how
debtors employ § 363, some courts have suggested a new set of criteria for
evaluating motions for a sale.170

163 See generally Russell A. Eisenberg & Frances F. Gecker, The Doctrine of Necessity and Its
Parameters, 73 MARQ. L. REV. 1 (1989).
164 COLLIER, supra note 10, ¶ 363.02 (citing In re Solar Mfg. Corp., 176 F.2d 493 (3d Cir. 1949)).
165 Id.
166 In re Bos. Generating, LLC, 440 B.R. 302, 329 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010).
167 Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel), 722 F.2d 1063, 1071 (2d. Cir. 1983).
168 Id.
169 Supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text; see Baird, supra note 3, at 81.
170 See generally In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. 84, 95 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d sub nom. Ind. State
Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC (In re Chrysler LLC), 576 F.3d 108, 111 (2d Cir. 2009), aff’d, 556 U.S.
960, 960 (2009), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 1015 (2009), remanded, 592 F.3d 370 (2d Cir. 2010) (explaining that
whether an asset is a “melting ice cube” with decreasing value and little prospect of continuing business
operations is the overriding factor); see also Jessica Uziel, Comment, Section 363(B) Restructuring Meets the
Sound Business Purpose Test with Bite: An Opportunity to Rebalance the Competing Interests of Bankruptcy
Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1189, 1196 (2011) (discussing factors adopted in In re Gulf Coast Oil Corp., 404 B.R.
407, 418 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009)).
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The GM court embraced the Lionel factors but expanded upon them.171 It
listed four additional factors:
1. Does the estate have the liquidity to survive until
confirmation of a plan?
2. Will the sale opportunity still exist as of the time of plan
confirmation?
3. If not, how likely is it that there will be a satisfactory
alternative sale opportunity, or a stand-alone plan
alternative that is equally desirable (or better) for creditors?
4. Is there a material risk that by deferring the sale, the patient
will die on the operating table?172
Careful to assert that it was not departing from § 363 precedent, the court
explained that these supplemental factors still address Lionel’s original
question of whether there is a good reason to confirm the sale prior to the
confirmation of a plan.173 These supplemental factors rest on the DIP’s
speculation on the necessity of the sale, rather than the more objective Lionel
factors. The deference afforded in these “supplemental” factors nonetheless
suggests they do supplant the Lionel factors.174
In GM, the court focused on plummeting consumer confidence as the
impetus for completing the sale quickly.175 Despite acknowledging that the
U.S. government would not walk away if the court took extra time for
authorization, the court approved the quick sale because no other qualified
bidders would emerge before the assets deteriorated in value.176 Guided by this
precedent, the In re Boston Generating court applied these new factors to find
that the debtor did not have sufficient liquidity to survive until confirmation of
a plan, given the costs and time of confirming a contested plan.177
The Lionel valid business purpose threshold for approving a sale derives
from a wealth of corporate law holding that managers are better suited to make
business decisions, but the valid business purpose test does not capture the
171
172
173
174
175
176
177

In re Gen. Motors, 407 B.R. 463, 490 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 492.
Id. at 492–93.
In re Bos. Generating, LLC, 440 B.R. 302, 328–29 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010).
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same skepticism with regards to conflicts of interest. In corporate law, as long
as the management acted in good faith and with due care in making decisions,
judges will not second guess business judgments in retrospect.178 Bankruptcy
courts recognize that same principle: judges are no better equipped for making
business decisions for insolvent companies than solvent ones.179
Corporate law affords less deference when self-interest may cloud
management’s judgment.180 While bankruptcy courts are skeptical of
“insider”181 transactions, conflicts of interest other than those enumerated by
Code’s definition of “insider” may arise. Though large creditors as buyers in
§ 363 sales raise similar concerns to those created by insider transactions, they
do not fit within this definition. A debtor’s management is inevitably biased in
favor of survival rather than economic efficiency or fair distribution to
creditors.182 By calling the bluff of a powerful creditor exerting leverage,
management runs the risk of dooming the reorganization and its own job
security.183 In bankruptcy, management’s prior incentives as equity holders184
disappear since equity interests are subordinate to creditors;185 thus,
management has little to lose by acceding to buyer demands.186 Buyers can use
this leverage to manufacture a valid business purpose to get the sale done as
quickly as possible.187 Once the sale order is final, appeals of the sale are moot.

178

Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (“The business judgment rule is a
presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in
good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.” (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984))).
179 Agarwal v. Pomona Valley Med. Grp. (In re Pomona Valley Med. Grp.), 476 F.3d 665, 670 (9th Cir.
2007). However, other countries automatically remove existing management once a company is insolvent,
believing insolvency demonstrates their ineptitude. Ziad Raymond Azar, Bankruptcy Policy: A Review and
Critique of Bankruptcy Statutes and Practices in Fifty Countries Worldwide, 16 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L.
279, 289–301 (2008) (outlining rationales for displacing management in bankruptcy).
180 E.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, §§ 144, 271 (2012); REVISED MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 8.61, 12.02
(2008).
181 See 11 U.S.C. § 101(31)(b) (2006).
182 Charles Jordan Tabb, Emergency Preferential Orders in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 65 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 75, 79 (1991) (citing Otte v. Mfrs. Hanover Commercial Corp. (In re Texlon Corp.), 596 F.2d 1092, 1098
(2d Cir. 1979); In re FCX, Inc., 54 B.R. 833, 838 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1985)).
183 Tabb, supra note 182, at 79.
184 Corporations often align corporate and managerial interests through equity ownership. Tabb, supra
note 182, at 79.
185 Case v. L.A. Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 120 (1939) (stating it has long been a tenet of
bankruptcy that debt creditors are entitled to priority over stockholders).
186 Tabb, supra note 182, at 79.
187 See infra Part II.A.2.
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C. Interpretations of Section 363(m) Mootness
There is broad agreement among courts on the importance of protecting
good faith buyers, but the interpretation of § 363(m)’s breadth is not consistent
among circuits.188 Many courts interpret § 363(m) to mandate a per se
mootness rule anytime the appellant did not obtain a stay pending appeal, but
some courts recognize narrow exceptions to the rule.189 These exceptions seek
to remedy errors against creditors when such relief would not undermine
finality.
1. The Per Se Rule
Many courts read § 363(m) broadly and adopt a per se rule that any appeal
will be moot unless the movant obtained a stay.190 These courts hold that
mootness applies even if the appeal would raise a question of whether property
belonged to the estate191 or whether the issuing court had proper jurisdiction.192
Courts that observe the per se rule find that even if the bankruptcy court erred
in authorizing the sale, the appeal must be dismissed.193 Discussing the breadth
of statutory mootness after denying an appeal, the Seventh Circuit, in In re
Sax, explained that whether the court acted correctly does not matter, because
“[s]ection 363(m) does not say that the sale must be proper under § 363(b); it
says the sale must be authorized under § 363(b).”194 This reasoning produces
an absurd result by which a court can act outside the scope of its authority, and
188 Compare In re Sax, 796 F.2d 994 (7th Cir. 1986), with Krebs Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Valley
Motors, Inc., 141 F.3d 490 (3d Cir. 1998).
189 Despite the narrow exceptions, it is unclear whether these exceptions apply in any significant or
consistent way. Kuney, supra note 107. For example, In re Rickel Home Centers, Inc., 209 F.3d 291 (3d Cir.
2000) acknowledges the exception created in its circuit by Krebs, but reasons it does not apply in the case at
bar.
190 E.g., Parker v. Goodman (In re Parker), 499 F.3d 616, 620–21 (6th Cir. 2007) (declining to adopt the
Third Circuit’s approach); Sax, 796 F.2d at 997; United States v. Salerno, 932 F.2d 117, 122–23 (2d Cir.
1991); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Miller (In re Stadium Mgmt. Corp.), 895 F.2d 845, 847 (1st Cir. 1990);
Cargill, Inc. v. Charter Int’l Oil Co. (In re Charter Co.), 829.F.2d 1054 (11th Cir. 1987); Magwood v.
Pearlstein (In re Magwood), 785 F.2d 1077, 1080–81 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
191 See, e.g., Hazelbaker v. Hope Gas, Inc. (In re Rare Earth Minerals), 445 F.3d 359, 364 (4th Cir. 2006)
(quoting Sax, 796 F.2d at 997–98); Campbell v. Motors Liquidation Co. (In re Motors Liquidation Co.), 428
B.R. 43, 54–55 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). But see Rutherford Hosp., Inc. v. RNH P’ship, 168 F.3d 693, 699 (4th Cir.
1999).
192 In re Edwards, 962 F.2d 641, 644 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding collateral appeals are not permissible); In re
Gilchrist, 891 F.2d 559, 561 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that finality precludes reversal because the appellant
forfeited the opportunity to contest jurisdiction by not obtaining a stay).
193 See, e.g., Rare Earth Minerals, 445 F.3d 363; Canzano v. Ragosa (In re Colarusso), 382 F.3d 51, 62
(1st Cir. 2004).
194 Sax, 796 F.2d at 997–98.
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then be immune to future review.195 The Sax court explained that allowing
reversal of the sale, despite lack of jurisdiction, would contravene the finality
goals of 363(m).196 Because looking for exceptions would undermine the
purpose of the provision, § 363(m) must be followed “precisely.”197 The court
urged that the appellant should have obtained a stay immediately, and not
doing so foreclosed the opportunity to appeal.198 Statutory mootness operates
to preclude review and protect the good faith buyer, and whether the
bankruptcy court’s action was substantively wrong in authorizing the sale is
irrelevant.199
2. Carving Holes into Statutory Mootness: Exceptions to the Rule
Faced with the harshness of the per se rule, in the late 1990s, courts began
exhibiting more willingness to review appeals.200 These courts reasoned that
the plain language of § 363(m) does not preclude any relief, just the reversal or
modification of the sale; thus, courts still have a duty to examine the feasibility
of relief.201 Seeking to avoid a per se rule’s stark treatment to wronged

195 Parker v. Goodman (In re Parker), 499 F.3d 616, 623 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Charter, 829 F.2d at
1055–56); see also Rare Earth Minerals, 445 F.3d at 364 (explaining an exception to statutory mootness
whenever a claimant asserts the property was not property of the estate would destroy the rule altogether). But
see Rutherford Hosp., Inc., 168 F.3d at 699 (holding that the bankruptcy court does not have jurisdiction to
allow a conveyance of property not part of the estate).
196 Sax, 796 F.2d at 998.
197 Id.
198 Id. at 997–98.
199 Canzano v. Ragosa (In re Colarusso), 382 F.3d 51, 62 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting Tri-Can, Inc. v. Fallon
(In re Tri-Can, Inc.), 98 B.R. 609, 618 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989)); John M. Collen, Section 363(m) Title
Endorsements, 4 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 531, 536 (1995) (citing United Mine Workers of Am. Combined Fund
v. CF & I Fabricators (In re CF & I Fabricators), 169 B.R. 984, 992 (D. Utah 1994)). Contra Cal-Bay Int’l,
Inc. v. Supertail Mfg. Co. (In re Supertrail Mfg. Co.), 383 F. App’x 475, 478 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding that
§ 363(m) does not apply to assets not in the bankruptcy estate).
200 E.g., Contrarian Funds LLC v. Aretex LLC (In re Westpoint Stevens, Inc.), 600 F.3d 231, 249 (2d Cir.
2010) (noting there may be a narrow exception when the challenge is divorced from the overall transaction and
would not affect any of the purchaser’s reliance); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Trism, Inc. (In re
Trism, Inc.), 328 F.3d 1003, 1006–07 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding there could be a narrow exception so long as the
challenge would not affect the validity of the sale); Krebs Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Valley Motors, Inc., 141
F.3d 490, 498–99 (3d Cir. 1998) (discussing the courts which adopt the majority approach and announcing an
exception); Bullock v. Telluride Income Growth LP (In re Telluride Income Growth LP), 364 B.R. 407, 414
(B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2007) (holding that a remedy “can be granted without affecting the validity of the sale”).
201 In re AOV Indus., Inc., 792 F.2d 1140, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 1986); see also Bank of N.Y. Trust Co. v.
Official Unsecured Creditors’ Comm. (In re Pac. Lumber Co.), 584 F.3d 229, 241 (5th Cir. 2009); Trans
World Airlines, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc. (In re Texaco Inc.), 92 B.R. 38, 44–45 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
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creditors, courts mimic the approach to equitable mootness.202 These courts
consider whether they can fashion any relief before mooting an appeal for
which a stay pending appeal was not obtained.203 Despite rejecting the per se
rule, these courts carve out a narrow exception in which mootness will not
operate—the strong policy favoring finality typically prevails. 204
The exception view considers two factors before mooting an appeal: (1)
whether there was a stay; and (2) whether the reversal or modification of the
authorization would affect the validity of the sale.205 This construction of the
exception imports no analysis outside of the words in § 363(m).206 The
presence of a state law remedy, for instance, does not render the appeal on the
merits moot.207 Courts have interpreted several other situations falling under
this exception: the creditor-purchaser is party to the appeal and the court can
exercise equitable principles to reverse the sale;208 the liquidation of assets in a
commercially unreasonable manner, such as a fraudulent transfer;209 and
appeals concerning the distribution of the proceeds of the closed sale.210 To
moot an appeal, the proponent of mootness must demonstrate that there is no
remedy available to the appellant.211 Courts reject motions for mootness when

202 See Manges v. Seattle-First Nat’l Bank (In re Magnes), 29 F.3d 1034, 1040 (5th Cir. 1994); see also
Mac Panel Co. v. Va. Panel Corp., 283 F.3d 622, 625 (4th Cir. 2002) (explaining that courts apply a “totality
of circumstances” test before mooting an appeal).
203 See supra note 200 and accompanying text; see also Colarusso, 382 F.3d at 62 (quoting Tri-Can, Inc.,
98 B.R. at 618). Contra Cal-Bay Int’l, Inc. v. Supertail Mfg. Co. (In re Supertrail Mfg. Co.), 383 F. App’x
475, 478–81 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding that § 363(m) does not apply to assets not in the bankruptcy estate).
204 Contrarian Funds LLC v. Aretex LLC (In re WestPoint Stevens, Inc.), 600 F.3d 231, 248–49 (2d Cir.
2010) (discussing the goal of protecting good faith buyers); see also Kuney, supra note 107.
205 Cinicola v. Scharffenberger, 248 F.3d 110, 128 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Krebs Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v.
Valley Motors, Inc., 141 F.3d 490, 499 (3d Cir. 1998)); see also Mission Iowa Wind Co. v. Enron Corp. (In re
Enron Corp.), 291 B.R. 39, 41–42 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
206 See supra Part I.B.
207 Suter v. Goedert, 504 F.3d 982, 990–91 (9th Cir. 2007). On remand, the district court upheld the
bankruptcy court’s finding against the appellants, after the court considered the matter on the merits. Suter v.
Goedert (In re Suter), 396 B.R. 535 (D. Nev. 2008).
208 Sun Valley Ranches, Inc. v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y (In re Sun Valley Ranches, Inc.), 823
F.2d 1373, 1375 (9th Cir.1987); see also Taylor v. Lake (In re CADA Inv., Inc.), 664 F.2d 1158, 1160 (9th
Cir. 1981); Willamette Water Front, Ltd. v. Victoria Station, Inc. (In re Victoria Station Inc.), 88 B.R. 231, 234
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1988). Contra Gwinnett Bank & Trust Co. v. Matos (In re Matos), 790 F.2d 864, 856 n.3
(11th Cir. 1986) (rejecting any contrast between statutory rights of redemption and sale of stock).
209 Hicks v. Brandt (In re Healthco Int’l, Inc.), 136 F.3d 45, 50–51 (1st Cir. 1998).
210 In re Lloyd, 37 F.3d 271, 273 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Salerno, 932 F.2d 117, 123 (2d Cir.
1991) (holding that while an appeal concerning a sale order was moot, appellant was free to object to the
distribution of the proceeds).
211 See Osborn v. Durant Bank & Trust Co. (In re Osborn), 24 F.3d 1199, 1203 (10th Cir. 1994),
abrogated in part on other grounds by Eastman v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 493 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2007),
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the movant fails to establish that there is no meaningful remedy available
without invalidating the sale.212
In 1998, the Third Circuit explicitly rejected a per se rule in Krebs
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Valley Motors, Inc., holding that an appeal is not
moot if relief can be fashioned without affecting the validity of the sale.213
Despite creating an exception, the court nonetheless dismissed appeal at bar as
moot because any remedy would have affected the validity of the sale.214
Circuit precedent dictated that any kind of attack on the sale price would
impermissibly affect the validity of the sale.215 In Krebs, the appellant argued
that a refund would come from another creditor (who was also the buyer), not
an innocent third party.216 The court stated that the statute does not
differentiate between buyers who are creditors and third-party buyers.217 The
policy of finality prevailed because not mooting the sale would make bidders
fear that the winning bid may not be the final sale price.218
Although several circuits have embraced a similar exception, the breadth of
what constitutes a challenge to the validity of the sale leaves unclear what kind
of relief is possible, since nearly anything could challenge the validity of the
sale. In In re Trism, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted “affecting
the validity of the sale” as anything on which the purchaser relied when
agreeing to the purchase.219 The court defined a provision as unalterable on
appeal under § 363(m) if it is so closely linked to the agreement that modifying
or reversing it would adversely affect the parties’ bargained-for-exchange.”220

abrogated by Shayesteh v. Raty, 404 F. App’x. 298, (10th Cir. 2010) (holding that federal principles of judicial
estoppel apply to both federal and pendent state-law claims but not addressing when mootness operates).
212 C.O.P. Coal Dev. Co. v. C.W. Mining Co. (In re C.W. Mining Co.), 641 F.3d 1235, 1239 (10th Cir.
2011); Search Mkt. Direct, Inc. v. Jubber (In re Paige), 584 F.3d 1327, 1336–37 (10th Cir. 2009); Suter, 504
F.3d at 986–87.
213 Krebs Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Valley Motors, Inc., 141 F.3d 490, 499 (3d Cir. 1998) (rejecting the
per se rule, based on the interpretation of Third Circuit precedent in Resolution Trust Corp. v. Swedeland Dev.
Grp., Inc. (In re Swedelend Dev. Grp., Inc.), 16 F.3d 552 (3d Cir. 1994) (en banc) that 11 U.S.C. § 364(e) does
not provide that § 363(m) moots every appeal without a stay).
214 Krebs Chrysler-Plymouth, 141 F.3d at 500.
215 Id. (relying on Pittsburgh Food & Beverage Inc. v. Ranallo, 112 F.3d 645 (3d Cir. 1997)).
216 Id.
217 Id.
218 Id. (citing Pittsburgh Food & Beverage, 112 F.3d at 645).
219 Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Trism, Inc. (In re Trism, Inc.), 328 F.3d 1003, 1006–07 (8th
Cir. 2003). This provision was a release from any liability on avoidance claims for the majority shareholder.
Id. at 1006.
220 Id. at 1007.
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Although some courts and scholars contend that the exception to the per se
rule is virtually toothless,221 it incorporates equitable principles to ensure that if
an injustice can be remedied without undermining finality, the court should do
so. Advocates of a per se rule may contend that leaving the door open to even a
sliver of contention whether mootness will operate undermines the motivations
for a strong a policy of finality;222 a buyer may worry that her case might fit
into that ambit of the mysterious exception.223 However, narrowing § 363(m)
to allow creditors an equitable form of relief has not deterred § 363 sales since
the exception’s articulation over a decade ago in Delaware’s circuit, where
sales have dramatically increased.224
3. Clear Channel
In 2008, a Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit decision further
chipped away at § 363(m) by holding that the mootness provision does not
apply to subsection (f) of § 363 but only to subsections (b) and (c), in Clear
Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. Knupfer (In re PW, LLC).225 The court’s reasoning
focused on a plain language reading of the statute.226 Other circuits declined to
follow this decision because it was against the weight of authority and
subsection (f) only operates in conjunction with sales under subsection (b),
thereby requiring the same mootness protections.227 In contrast with the Ninth
Circuit’s narrow reading of the § 363(m), the Sixth Circuit applied § 363(m) to
subsections (f) and (h).228 Courts that rejected Ninth Circuit’s reasoning held
that buyers rely on the “free and clear” provision of § 363(f), and disturbing it

221 Contrarian Funds LLC v. Aretex LLC (In re WestPoint Stevens, Inc.), 600 F.3d 231, 249 (2d Cir.
2010) (citing Kuney, supra note 107, at 271–72) (explaining the exception is so narrow, that for practical
purposes, the Third Circuit has a per se rule).
222 In re Sax, 796 F.2d 994, 997–98 (7th Cir.1986) (discussing that any exception would undermine
finality).
223 Collen, supra note 199, at 532 (discussing clients who are still skeptical that mootness will protect
them).
224 See infra Appendix A, Chart 2.
225 Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. Knupfer (In re PW, LLC), 391 B.R. 25, 35–36 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2008);
see also 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2006); supra text accompanying note 12 (explaining § 363(f)).
226 The court noted that because the text of § 363(m) reads “[t]he reversal or modification on appeal of an
authorization under subsection (b) or (c) of this section of a sale or lease of property does not affect the
validity,” it does not apply to § 363(f). Clear Channel, 391 B.R. at 35 (emphasis added).
227 See Official Comms. of Unsecured Creditors v. Anderson Senior Living Props., LLC (In re Nashville
Senior Living, LLC), 407 B.R. 222, 231 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2009) (discussing the courts that adopt its approach
and finding that ultimately, the sale is made pursuant to subsection (b) or (c)), aff’d, 620 F.3d 584 (6th Cir.
2010).
228 Id. at 228, 231. Section 363(h) pertains to the sale of co-owned property. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(h).
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would alter the parties’ bargained-for exchange and thereby challenge the
sale’s validity.229
Since the Clear Channel decision, courts, including those in the Ninth
Circuit, have continued to apply § 363(m) to § 363(f).230 Appellants may
attempt to use Clear Channel as strategic leverage to try to circumvent
mootness, but the result of Clear Channel was yet another equitable exception
to § 363(m), with limited applicability.231 The Ninth Circuit BAP’s purpose
was to avoid § 363(m)’s harsh results. Before assessing statutory mootness, the
Clear Channel court first determined the decision was not equitably moot.232
Recognizing the unfairness in denying an appeal when relief could still be
equitably granted, the court then crafted an explanation as to why § 363(m) did
not apply under the circumstances.233
After the court’s decision, critics posited the death of § 363 sales, at least in
the Ninth Circuit.234 Yet, three years later, evidence has not borne out these
claims.235 Data indicates that motions for § 363 used sales in the Ninth Circuit
do not vary from the trends in the most frequently used courts for § 363
motions—the Southern District of New York and the District of Delaware.236

229 Asset Based Res. Grp., LLC v. U.S. Trustee (In re Polaroid Corp.), 611 F.3d 438, 441 (8th Cir. 2010)
(citing Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Trism, Inc. (In re Trism, Inc.), 328 F.3d 1003, 1007 (8th Cir.
2003)); GAF Holdings, LLC v. Rinaldi (In re Farmland Indus.), 408 B.R. 497, 508–09 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2009).
230 See, e.g., In re Thorpe Insulation Co., No. 11-688 DSF, 2011 WL 1378537, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 11,
2011); In re Namco Capital Grp., Inc., No. 10-0766 GAF, 2011 WL 2312090, at *2–3 (C.D. Cal. June 7,
2011); In re Jolan, Inc., 403 B.R. 866, 867–69 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2009) (denying the motion but holding that
Clear Channel does not prohibit such use of § 363).
231 James T. Markus, et al., Recent Developments in Asset Sales, in AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
THIRD HAWAI’I BANKRUPTCY WORKSHOP, at *2–3 (2010), available at Westlaw, 081110 ABI-CLE 23.
232 Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. Knupfer (In re PW, LLC), 391 B.R. 25, 33–35 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2008).
233 See id. at 35–37.
234 See, e.g., Richard J. Corbi, Section 363(f) “Free and Clear” Sales May Not Survive Appeal, 18
NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. ART. 8 (Jan. 2009); Dennis J. Connolly & Sage M. Sigler, NORTON BANKR. L.
ADVISER, Nov. 2008, available at Westlaw, 2008 No. 11 Norton Bankr. L. Adviser 2 (arguing that the terms of
the sale cannot be treated separately on appeal; Joel H. Levitin et al., Ninth Circuit BAP Dresses Down
Lienstripping—Could This Be the Last Dance for 363 Sales?, 27 AM. BANKR. INST. J., Oct. 2008, at 1, 53.
235 Jo Ann J. Brighton & Felton E. Parrish, Two Recent Decisions Show that § 363 Sales are Not Dead in
the Ninth Circuit, AM. BANKR. INST. J., July–Aug. 2009, at 42, 42–43.
236 See infra Appendix A, Chart 3; Appendix B; see also Kenneth N. Russak, Section 363 Real Estate
Sales Are Still Feasible After Clear Channel, L.A. LAW., Mar. 2009, at 10, 13–14 (“Rumors of the death of the
363 sale are greatly exaggerated.”); Shirley S. Cho & Bennett L. Spiegel, Clear Channel Muddies the Waters
of § 363(m) Mootness Protection, 26 No. 2 THE BANKRUPTCY STRATEGIST 1 (Dec. 2008) (predicting Clear
Channel will not be followed in the Ninth Circuit or elsewhere).
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D. The Difficulty of Getting an Appeal
Though the exceptions to § 363(m) are narrow in scope, they aim to
compensate for reversible errors made during the short authorization process.
Since a creditor’s efforts to secure a stay pending appeal are often
unsuccessful, an equitable reading of § 363(m) may be the only opportunity for
retroactively protecting creditors’ due process rights.
1. The Illusive Stay Pending Appeal
Although Rule 6004(h) provides an automatic fourteen-day stay before any
sale order consummates, it grants the judge discretion to shorten or eliminate
the stay.237 In theory, the rule aims to avoid the race to court between a creditor
(seeking to stop the sale) and a seller (seeking quick approval and mootness
protection).238 In practice, courts almost always eliminate the stay, given the
debtor’s push to complete the sale quickly.239 As discussed above, a stay
pending appeal is an extraordinary remedy, and parties are unlikely to succeed
on their motion.240
Because Rule 6004(h) does not provide any guidance on when and why a
court may eliminate this stay, courts regularly eliminate it. In contrast, Rule
2002 requires a “cause shown” standard to shorten the time mandated for
notice.241 Although “cause shown” is an amorphous test, the absence of this
phrase in Rule 6004(h) explains the provision’s lack of fortitude.242 Rule 8017
explicitly limits the duration of a stay pending appeal to thirty days, unless
there is cause shown to extend it.243 If a potential appellant’s stay cannot be
extended without cause shown, the same standard should apply for purging the
fourteen-day stay. The small period could be enough time for a potential
appellant to petition the court for review of a meritorious appeal. Although the
Rules recognize a balancing of debtors’ needs against creditors’ rights, the
toothless rule fails to give creditors’ rights much weight.

237

FED. R. BANKR. P. 6004(h).
COLLIER, supra note 10, ¶ 363.11.
239 Athanas, supra note 77.
240 See supra Part I.C.
241 FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002(a).
242 E.g., id. 1006(b)(2), 2002(a), 3015, 9006(b)(1). However, Rule 3020 and Rule 4002 provide analogous
discretion for the judge to remove a fourteen-day stay. Id. 3020, 4002.
243 Id. 8017(b).
238
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Noting the Rule’s lack of guidance on when to shorten the stay, the
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York in In re Borders
Group, Inc. relied on the Collier treatise to interpret the Rule to have sharper
teeth than most courts do.244 The treatise explains that a court should not lift
the stay when objections have been raised, unless there is a showing of a
business need to close the sale sooner and the interests of the objecting parties
likely to succeed on appeal are sufficiently protected in the amount of time
afforded.245 The court then balanced the interests of both parties and found that
a reduced five-day stay would allow Borders to turn over its property to
landlords and still give creditors sufficient notice to have their objections heard
for sales of low-value assets.246 In other cases, courts have waived stays when
there is evidence that a delay will cause the debtor to incur additional costs,247
where the debtor had no more cash248 or the debtor had negative cash flow.249
2. Appealing a Denial of a Motion for a Stay Pending Appeal
An attempt to appeal the denial of a stay may come too late for relief to be
possible. There are instances when a party did not obtain a stay pending appeal
because of a procedural glitch: the party did not receive notice the order had
been confirmed,250 the parties were in settlement negotiations,251 or the party
learned of the sale too late and assumed seeking the stay pending appeal was
futile.252

244 In re Borders Grp., Inc., 453 B.R. 477, 486 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing 10 COLLIER, supra note 10,
6004.0111 ).
245 Id.
246 Id.
247 Yamaha Motor Corp., USA v. Perry Hollow Mgmt. Co., Inc. (In re Perry Hollow Mgmt. Co., Inc.),
297 F.3d 34, 41 (1st Cir. 2002).
248 Hower v. Molding Sys. Eng’g Corp., 445 F.3d 935, 938 (7th Cir. 2006).
249 In re Nature Leisure Times, LLC, No. 06-41357, 2007 WL 4554276, at *2–3 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. Dec.
19, 2007).
250 Nordhoff Invs., Inc. v. Zenith Elecs. Corp., 258 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 2001).
251 E.g., Contrarian Funds LLC v. Aretex LLC (In re WestPoint Stevens, Inc.), 600 F.3d 231, 252–53 (2d
Cir. 2010).
252 In re Tempo Tech. Corp., 202 B.R. 363, 365, 373–74 (D. Del. 1996) (appellants learned of the sale
approval when the unsecured creditors’ committee formed, six days after the sale and transfer of assets
occurred). However, ignorance of the law and the necessity for a stay after an expeditious proceeding is not an
excuse for not obtaining a stay. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. CIBC Woody Gundy Ventures (In
re Temtechco, Inc., No. 95-00596, 1998 WL 887256 (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 18, 1998) (quoting In re CGI
Indus., Inc., 27 F.3d 296, 300 n.8 (7th Cir. 1994)).
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As discussed above, each factor of consideration imposes a high standard
for obtaining a stay pending appeal.253 Finalizing a sale quickly is in the
interests of the buyer and the debtor. Yet, a party that fails to get a stay will
have no further remedy. While most courts hold that an appeal absent a stay is
moot, some courts provide more leeway for parties that unsuccessfully moved
for a stay.254 Despite courts’ observation of a strict mootness rule, courts have
recognized the harsh results that come from the denial of a stay: no opportunity
for review.255
3. Challenges to Good Faith
Section 363(m) explicitly provides that its protections apply only to good
faith purchasers.256 Today, most bankruptcy courts’ sale orders include an
explicit finding of good faith, but rarely incorporate specific facts evidencing
good faith in the sale order.257 In In re Abbott Dairies, the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals rejected the notion that good faith was implicit in the bankruptcy
judge’s approval; rather, protection under § 363(m) requires an explicit finding
of good faith.258
The standard for a finding of good faith is a lax one, deferential to the
buyer unless there is egregious evidence to the contrary. As it is increasingly
common for a creditor to be the buyer in § 363 sales, there is an imbalance of
information in favor of the debtor and buyer (often the buyer-creditor).259
Although a transaction between a creditor with leverage and a debtor is not
253

See supra Part I,C.
See, e.g., Deutsche Bank AG, London Branch v. Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc. (In re Metromedia
Fiber Network, Inc.), 416 F.3d 136, 144–45 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. LTV Steel Co. (In
re Chateaugay Corp.), 94 F.3d 772, 776 (2d Cir. 1996)); Cartalemi v. Karta Corp. (In re Karta Corp.), 342
B.R. 45, 52–53 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
255 See e.g., Licensing by Paolo v. Sinatra (In re Gucci), 105 F. 3d 837, 840 (2d Cir. 1997) (“[A] district
judge deciding whether to stay a bankruptcy sale pending appeal . . . should be aware that a closing occurring
immediately after a stay is denied will substantially limit the scope of an appeal.” (emphasis omitted)).
256 11 U.S.C. § 363(m) (2006).
257 See generally General Order M-383, U.S. BANKR. COURT S. DIST. N.Y., http://www.nysb.uscourts.
gov/orders/m383.pdf (last visited Nov. 4, 2012); Guidelines Re Sale Orders, U.S. BANKR. COURT N. DIST.
CAL., http://www.canb.uscourts.gov/procedures/dist/guidelines/order-re-sale-orders (last visited Nov. 4, 2012);
Bob Eisenbach, Delaware Bankruptcy Court Adopts New Local Rule for Section 363 Sales, IN THE (RED): THE
BUSINESS BANKRUPTCY BLOG, http://bankruptcy.cooley.com/2008/02/articles/business-bankruptcy-issues/
delaware-bankruptcy-court-adopts-new-local-rule-for-section-363-sales/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2012); See also
Bob Eisenbach, Have Section 363 Sale Orders Gone too Far?, IN THE (RED): THE BUSINESS BANKRUPTCY
BLOG,
http://bankruptcy.cooley.com/2007/08/articles/business-bankruptcy-issues/have-section-363-saleorders-gone-too-far/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2012) (comparing sale motions in major districts).
258 In re Abbotts Dairies of Pa., Inc., 788 F.2d 143, 149–50 (3d Cir. 1986).
259 Keach, supra note 47, at 60.
254
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truly an arm’s length transaction,260 courts will generally make a finding of
good faith unless there is “strong contrary evidence that the stalking horse
lender has sought and obtained an unfair advantage over other bidders through
the [creditor] or a manipulation of the approval process.”261 Since courts often
authorize sales very soon after other creditors receive notice, it is unrealistic to
assume an outsider would be able to find evidence of an insiders’
manipulation.262
In theory, the burden of proving good faith falls upon its proponent;263 in
practice, the party challenging good faith would need to controvert the
evidence of good faith since the challenging party would unlikely have the
knowledge or information to provide direct evidence of bad faith.264 In the
short time frame before court authorization, it is unlikely a party would be able
to make this showing. Many courts require a challenge to good faith be raised
initially in the bankruptcy court or else the issue will also be moot on appeal.265
Recognizing this difficulty, the Ninth Circuit permits remand for the sole
purpose of determining good faith.266
If a creditor unearths new information after a sale is complete, the creditor
may have a remedy under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), which allows
relief from a final judgment.267 This rule can also be an avenue for review for a
260 An arm’s length transaction is “[a] transaction between two unrelated and unaffiliated parties” or a
“transaction between two parties, however closely related they may be, conducted as if the parties were
strangers, so that no conflict of interest arises.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1635 (9th ed. 2009).
261 Keach, supra note 47, at 60.
262 See LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 11, at 35 (stating it is naïve to expect a movant to bring forth
evidence of a conflict of interest).
263 T.C. Investors v. Joseph (In re M Capital Corp.), 290 B.R. 743, 745 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2003).
264 See e.g., In re Tempo Tech. Corp., 202 B.R. 363, 369–70 (D. Del. 1996) (dismissing the challenge to
good faith because there was no evidence or contravention of the only evidence of good faith: testimony of the
debtor’s president); Roe & Skeel, supra note 29, at 745–46 (stating it is naïve to expect a movant to bring forth
evidence of a conflict of interest).
265 Schum v. Zwirn Special Opportunities Fund LP (In re Watch Ltd.), 295 F. App’x 647, 650 (5th Cir.
2008); Parker v. Goodman (In re Parker), 499 F.3d 616, 620 (6th Cir. 2007); Hazelbaker v. Hope Gas, Inc. (In
re Rare Earth Minerals), 445 F.3d 359, 365 (4th Cir. 2006); Nieters v. Sevcik (In re Rodriquez), 258 F.3d 757,
759 (8th Cir. 2001); In re Abbotts Dairies of Pa., Inc., 788 F.2d 143, 150–51 (3d Cir. 1986).
266 See e.g., Cmty. Thrift & Loan v. Suchy (In re Suchy), 786 F.2d 900, 902 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding that
good faith and whether § 363 applies is the trial court’s domain); M Capital Corp., 290 B.R. at 748 (holding
that there must be evidentiary findings of good faith beyond just boilerplate); Thomas v. Namba (In re
Thomas), 278 B.R. 782, 785 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2002). Contra Watch Ltd., 257 Fed. App’x at 750 (citing Ginther
v. Ginther Trusts (In re Ginther Trusts), 238 F.3d 686, 688–89 (5th Cir. 2001) (declining to examine facts not
presented in the bankruptcy court)).
267 FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(2)–(3); see also Baldwin v. Credit Based Asset Servicing and Securitization, 516
F.3d 734, 737–38 (8th Cir. 2008) (allowing the movant reasonable time to move for relief); Nanak Resorts,
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party who received defective notice.268 Rule 9024 incorporates Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 60(b) into bankruptcy proceedings.269 Relief under this rule is
extraordinary and rarely granted.270 But even here, some courts hold that the
rule cannot trump § 363(m) and no relief is possible where the Code forecloses
it.271 Regardless of what view courts take, the dueling policies of protecting
creditor rights and the good faith purchaser collide. Even if the 60(b) motion is
successful, there may be no relief available but to take to the property away
from the good faith purchaser.272
4. Creditor Protections and Due Process
Due process ensures that creditors’ interests are not compromised. Ensuring
these minimal protections need not be unreasonably prohibitive to the goals of
reorganization. Courts can evaluate whether failings in procedure actually
deprive creditors of rights or are mere technicalities. Unfortunately, this
evaluation can pit a creditor’s small private interest against the public’s interest
in reorganization. Nonetheless, even the smallest interests merit the
fundamental protections of notice, an opportunity to be heard, and a chance to
remedy a deprivation.

Inc. v. Haskins Gas Serv., Inc. (In re Rome Family Corp.), No. 02-11771, 2010 WL 1381093, at *2 (Bankr. D.
Vt. Mar. 31, 2010) (holding that egregious failure of key parties to fulfill statutory duties merited an
extraordinary remedy); In re Aztec Supply Corp., 399 B.R. 480, 490 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2009) (same).
268 FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(4) (allows relief for when a judgment is void such as when a court lacks subject
matter of jurisdiction). Reversal under this rule requires a “plain usurpation of power.” Hunter v. Underwood,
362 F.3d 468, 475 (8th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).
269 FED. R. BANKR. P. 9024; see also S. Motor Co. v. Carter-Pritchett-Hodges, Inc. (In re MMH Auto.
Grp., LLC), 385 B.R. 347, 359 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2008) (outlining three approaches that courts take in response
to defective notice).
270 Nanak Resorts, Inc. v. Haskins Gas Serv. (In re Rome Family Corp.), 407 B.R. 65, 80–81 (Bankr. D.
Vt. 2009).
271 E.g., Contrarian Funds LLC v. Aretex LLC (In re WestPoint Stevens, Inc.), 600 F.3d 231, 250 (2d Cir.
2010) (holding § 363(m) strips the court of jurisdiction altogether and it must protect the entire order from
review, not just a part); In re Rickel & Assocs., Inc., 260 B.R. 673, 678 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“[T]he Rules
cannot provide a remedy that the Bankruptcy Code has substantively foreclosed.” (quoting Branchburg Plaza
Assocs., L.P. v. Fesq (In re Fesq) 153 F.3d 113, 116 (3d Cir. 1998))); see also Patrick M. Birneya, Bankruptcy
Rule 9024: Paper Tiger or Powerful Procedural Tool When Stacked Against the Bankruptcy Code, 18 J.
BANKR. L. & PRAC., Art. 4, available at Westlaw 18 J. Bankr. L. & Prac. 3 Art. 4 (arguing that the provisions
of the Code should always trump the Rules).
272 See MMH Auto. Grp., 385 B.R. at 360–61.
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a. Notice
To satisfy the due process clause, notice must inform the individual of the
impending hearing and provide time to prepare for it.273 Consistent with the
flexibility throughout the Code, Rule 2002 provides for shortened notice, if
circumstances merit it.274 Manufacturing an emergency situation, through a
lack of due diligence or failure to plan ahead, is not itself justification for
abridging the notice requirement.275 In Chrysler, the court held that publication
in national newspapers was adequate notice, particularly since the case had
been given so much public attention.276 In In re Haven Eldercare, the court
shortened notice periods because the conditions met the “financial extremis”
test—the value of assets was deteriorating the debtors were unable to find a
cash purchaser at auction, and there was no credible evidence that additional
notice would enhance the interests of any constituency.277
Though all courts acknowledge that defective notice can invalidate a sale,
they disagree on whether defective notice bars the operation of § 363(m).278
Because the text of § 363(b) allows sales only “after notice and a hearing,”279
some courts hold that inadequate notice invalidates a sale.280 These courts hold
that an appellant may appeal even absent a stay pending appeal.281 Other courts
273 Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Ctr. Wholesale, Inc. (In re Ctr. Wholesale, Inc.), 759 F.2d 1440
(9th Cir. 1985) (quoting Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 14 (1978)).
274 FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002(a)(2).
275 In re Fort Wayne Assoc., L.P., No. 97-10378, 1998 WL 928419, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. Dec. 16,
1998); see also In re Amagansett Family Farm, Inc., No. 11-73929-AST, 2011 WL 5079493, at *5 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2011); In re Fields, No. 05-71190, 2007 WL 1549760, at *1 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. May 29,
2007); In re Villareal, 160 B.R. 786, 787–88 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1993); In re Grant Broad. of Phila., Inc., 71
B.R. 390, 397 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (holding accommodating a witness is not sufficient reason to push up
notice).
276 In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. 84, 109 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d sub nom. Ind. State Police
Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC (In re Chrysler LLC), 576 F.3d 108, 111 (2d Cir. 2009), aff’d 556 U.S. 960,
960 (2009), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 1015 (2009), remanded, 592 F.3d 370 (2d Cir. 2010).
277 In re Haven Eldercare, LLC, 390 B.R. 762, 769, 770 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2008). But see In re Sandra
Cotton, Inc., 65 B.R. 153, 156 (W.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding the bankruptcy judge overstepped judicial discretion
because the circumstances did not meet “financial extremis”).
278 Howard J. Steinberg & Sean T. Torres, Consequences of Improper Notice, 1 BANKRUPTCY LITIGATION
§ 3.47 (2011).
279 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (2006) reads: “The trustee, after notice and a hearing, may use, sell, or lease,
other than in the ordinary course of business, property of the estate . . . .”
280 See e.g., In re Cavalieri, 142 B.R. 710, 720 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1992) (nulling the sale because lack of
adequate notice violated 363(b) and Rule 2002(a)(2)).
281 In re Longoria, 400 B.R. 543, 552 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2009); see, e.g., Citicorp Mortg. v. Brooks (In re
Ex-Cel Concrete Co.), 178 B.R. 198, 205 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995); IRS v. Moberg Trucking, Inc. (In re Moberg
Trucking, Inc.), 112 B.R. 362, 363–64 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1990); see also Beneficial Cal., Inc. v. In re Villar (In
re Villar), 317 B.R. 88, 94 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2004) (explaining that “the litigant attempting to effect service is
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hold that although defective notice is cause to set aside a sale on appeal, it
alone does not void a sale.282 These courts reason that the goals of finality and
protecting good faith buyers should operate as under other circumstances.283
Before voiding a sale, these courts assess the harm to the inadequately notified
party against the finality interests of a good faith purchaser.284 These courts
decline to void a sale if the objecting party had actual notice, but not formal
notice, of the hearing.285
For instance, in In re CLC Corp., an objecting party’s failure to inform the
bankruptcy court of a transfer of interest, which resulted in the lack of formal
compliance with notice requirements, was a technicality that should not
invalidate the whole sale.286 In In re Edwards, the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals dismissed an appeal as moot although the creditor never received
formal notice before the sale because the objecting creditor neglected to take
action for three and half months after receiving actual notice and eighteen
months after the sale’s approval.287 The court reasoned that denial of due
process, like any legal error, is waived if not timely raised.288 In In re Ex-Cel
Concrete Co., the Ninth Circuit rejected the Edwards balancing approach in
favor of stricter protection for due process rights.289 In this instance, the Ninth
Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Court found that no notice was a jurisdictional
defect and voided the sale.290

responsible for proper service and bears the burden of proof”); Doolittle v. Santa Cruz (In re Metzger), 346
B.R. 806, 816, 815 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2006).
282 Gekas v. Pipin (In re Met-L-Wood Corp.), 861 F.2d 1012, 1018 (7th Cir. 1988); Knupfer v. HSA
Residential Mortg. Servs., Inc. (In re Lau Capital Funding, Inc.), 321 B.R. at 295 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2005);
Newman Grill Sys., LLC v. Ducane Gas Grills, Inc. (In re Ducane Gas Grills, Inc.), 320 B.R. 324, 332–33
(Bankr. D.S.C. 2004).
283 Met-L-Wood Corp., 861 F.2d at 1018 (noting that § 363(m) does not apply because all parties in the
case were guilty of fraud); Lau Capital Funding, 321 B.R. 287, 295 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2005) (holding that
though defective notice may cause the sale to be voidable, it does not itself void contract entirely); In re
Ducane Gas Grills, Inc., 320 B.R. at 332–33.
284 See In re F.A. Potts & Co., Inc., 86 B.R. 853, 861 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (“The notice requirement is
the fulcrum we use to balance a debtor’s title 11 protections against the Fifth Amendment guarantee that
creditors will not be deprived of ‘life, liberty or property’ without ‘due process of the law.’”), aff’d sub nom.
Appeal of Pagnotti Enterprises, Inc., 891 F.2d 282 (3d Cir. 1989).
285 LAWRENCE R. AHERN III & NANCY FRAAS MACLEAN, BANKR. PROC. MANUAL § 6004:1 (2011) (citing
Wood v. CLC Corp. (In re CLC Corp.), 110 B.R. 335, 339 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1990)); see also S. Motor Co.
v. Carter-Pritchett-Hodges, Inc. (In re MMH Auto Grp., LLC), 385 B.R. 347, 357–58 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2008).
286 Cf. CLC Corp., 110 B.R. at 340.
287 In re Edwards, 962 F.2d 641, 645 (7th Cir. 1991).
288 Id. at 644.
289 Citicorp Mortg. v. Brooks (In re Ex-Cel Concrete Co.), 178 B.R. 198, 204–05 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995).
290 Id. at 205.
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However, even the courts that take a harder line on voiding sales recognize
that if relief can be granted without rescinding a sale, the court should do so. In
In re Center Wholesale, the court acknowledged that the one-day’s notice the
creditor received was inadequate, so it sought a compromise that would protect
the creditor’s rights without reversing the sale to the good faith buyer.291 The
court remanded the case to the bankruptcy court and suggested the
inadequately notified party be placed in the position it occupied before the
sale.292
5. Manufacturing an Emergency
Deference to a debtor in assessing the need for urgent action leaves the
court vulnerable to a contrived emergency to appease an impatient buyer or
circumvent procedural norms. The Code recognizes that more fair and efficient
outcomes result from a rigid procedure that allows for timely deliberation and
distributions, rather than a race among creditors for the debtor’s property. Rule
6003 aimed to prevent certain creditors from getting an advantage by rushing
to court for the best treatment.293 While a quick resolution may have a better
outcome for an individual creditor, expediting these deliberations should not
come at the expense of other creditors’ rights.294
a. First-Day Orders
First-day orders, or those entered the first day after filing a petition,295 are
problematic because of their ability to circumvent the reorganization process
before assessing whether appointment of creditor committees is appropriate.296
Recognizing the disruption to the orderly procedure of bankruptcy that comes
from a rush to the courthouse for first-day orders, the Rules Committee added
Rule 6003 in 2008.297 Rule 6003 prohibits relief within the first twenty-one

291 Owens-Corning Fiberglass, Inc. v. Ctr. Wholesale, Inc. (In re Ctr. Wholesale, Inc.), 759 F.2d 1440,
1149–50 (9th Cir. 1985).
292 Id. at 1451 (suggesting that this could be achieved by granting Owens-Corning super-priority under
§ 507(b)).
293 See infra Part II.D.5.a.
294 See Bussel & Klee, supra note 37, at 738.
295 See generally Steven N. Cousins, et al., First Day Orders: An Examination, 11 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC.
213, 213 (2002).
296 ADVISORY COMM. ON BANKR. RULES, MEETING OF OCTOBER 2–3, 2008 147–48 (2008), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books/Bankruptcy/BK2008-10.pdf.
297 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 6003 advisory committee notes.
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days of petition unless there would be irreparable harm without action.298 In
essence, Rule 6003 acts as a speed bump, providing more time to all parties
and the court to consider to fundamental matters of the case.299
If “irreparable harm” would result absent immediate action, Rule 6003 has
an exception to the mandatory waiting period,300 but since debtors use § 363
sales for their speed, evidence that denying a sale would have any negative
effect on the debtor could suffice for a showing of irreparable harm. Like the
valid business purpose test, the irreparable harm standard forces the court to
defer to the debtor’s management on the urgent necessity of the sale.301 Thus,
the debtor’s portrayal of the situation colors both a court’s authorization of the
sale and its willingness to expedite creditors’ rights to avoid irreparable harm.
But, it is extremely rare for a business scenario to truly necessitate a sale
within twenty-one days.302 Irreparable harm requires a showing that the
movant will suffer “actual and imminent” harm, not just “speculative or
unsubstantiated” harm.303 A narrower interpretation of “irreparable harm,”
which imports an analysis similar to the doctrine of necessity, would limit its
application to rare and exceptional circumstances with veritable imminent
harm.304

298 Id. 6003. Prior to the enactment of Rule 6003, it was not uncommon for a large volume of documents
filed in the first days of a case. ADVISORY COMM. ON BANKR. RULES, supra note 296.
299 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 6003 advisory committee notes (2007 Adoption). Part of the impetus for time to
consider was to reduce the instance of forum shopping for courts more willing to grant relief immediately.
Memorandum from Bankruptcy Judges Advisory Group on Rule 6003, to Bankruptcy Rules Advisory
Committee (Aug. 24, 2008), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/BK%20
Suggestions%202008/08-BK-D-Suggestion-Bankruptcy%20Rules%20Advisory%20Committee.pdf.
300 FED. R. BANKR. P. 6003.
301 When applying the irreparable harm standard to critical vendor payments, courts generally approve
them so long as the debtor can show that a vendor has threatened to cut off post-petition goods or services if
not paid; the vendor cannot be easily replaced; and that such a creditor requires payment for prepetition
services before postpetition performance will be granted. In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866, 872–73 (7th Cir.
2004).
302 10 COLLIER, supra note 10, ¶ 6003.0102[3][b]. But see Bay Harbour Mgmt., L.C. v. Lehman Bros.
Holdings, Inc. (In re Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc.), 415 B.R. 77, 80–81 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (finding an
extraordinary emergency); In re Bombay Co., No. 07-44084-RFN-11, 2007 WL 2826071, at *3–4 (Bankr.
N.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2007) (same).
303 Abney v. Amgen, Inc., 443 F.3d 540, 552 (6th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
304 Andy Vara, The Impact of BAPCA and Rule Changes in Chapter 11 Cases, in 16TH ANNUAL CENTRAL
STATES BANKRUPTCY WORKSHOP, TRAVERSE CITY, MI. JUNE 11–14, 2009, available at Westlaw, 061109
ABI-CLE 359; Matthew T. Gensburg, et al., Business Practitioners: Life under BAPCPA—The Impact of
BAPCPA and Rule Changes in Chapter 11 Cases, in 16TH ANNUAL CENTRAL STATES BANKRUPTCY
WORKSHOP, supra at *2.
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The doctrine of necessity is an equitable doctrine that allows immediate
relief—the minimum necessary to maintain the debtor’s existence.305 Prior to
the enactment of Rule 6003, it governed consideration of first-day orders by
limiting such orders to those that would not violate or disregard anyone’s
substantive rights in ways not authorized by the Code.306 The doctrine of
necessity balances two prongs: the reorganization of viable entities and the
equal treatment of all creditors.307 Some remedies that allow for payment of
prepetition creditors defy equal treatment, but may be indispensable to
reorganization, such as a critical vendor.308
b. Demonstrating Irreparable Harm
The irreparable harm standard can be abused as a tool of appeasement of
creditors or potential buyers.309 When a debtor delays filing bankruptcy despite
knowledge of the pending situation to compel an urgent sale, it deprives
creditors of the opportunity to receive adequate notice.310 In In re Adamson,
the court found that the debtor’s delay to file its bankruptcy petition despite
prior knowledge of the need for long-term financing was bad faith.311 The
Adamson court analogized the request for emergency relief to the request for a
temporary restraining order under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.312 The
court said notice requirements for first-day orders, which grant a goingforward change, should be at least as burdensome for fundamental bankruptcy
matters as it is for temporary restraining orders, which preserve the status
quo.313 The debtor should not be able to circumvent this burden by delaying to
file a petition.314

305 10 COLLIER, supra note 10, ¶ 6003.01[1][b]; see also Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d at 871 (“A doctrine of
necessity’ is just a fancy name for a power to depart from the Code.”).
306 10 COLLIER, supra note 10, ¶ 6003.01[1][b] n.20 (citing In re Colad Grp., Inc., 324 B.R. 208, 213–14
(Bankr. W.D.N.Y 2005)).
307 In re United Am., Inc., 327 B.R. 776, 781 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2005).
308 Id. at 781–82 (explaining that for a vendor to receive critical vendor status, the payment must be in the
best interest of the debtors and other creditors; the transaction must be in sound business judgment; and not
prejudice other creditors).
309 Id. at 782.
310 In re Adamson Co., Inc., 29 B.R. 937, 941 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1983).
311 Id.
312 Id. at 940–41. Rule 65(b) allows a temporary restraining order without written or oral notice only if
immediate and irreparable injury, loss or damage will occur before notice can be served and the movant’s
attorney certifies in writing the efforts, if any, which have been made to provide parties in interest adequate
notice.
313 Id. at 941.
314 Id.
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The problem with the melting ice cube justification is that the debtor can
easily unplug the freezer.315 In In re Humboldt Creamery LLC, the court
reluctantly approved a sale, but explained that the modern trend of debtors
waiting until there is no ability to survive in chapter 11 strips the bankruptcy
judge of meaningful discretion, since the judge must decide between rubber
stamping a sale or rejecting the sale and allowing the debtor to fail.316 The
court explained that only a judge with exceptional courage would reject such a
sale.317 If a court believes the DIP contrived the emergency, it could refuse to
make a finding of good faith, thereby preventing the rushed sale from being
protected by mootness.318 However, rescinding mootness would still cause the
same problem as disapproving a sale outright: the threat of compromising the
reorganization or discouraging future buyers.319
III. BALANCING INTERESTS: DUE PROCESS & FINALITY
A. Flexible Due Process
Bankruptcy courts reasonably apply procedural due process as a flexible
concept to protect rights without undermining the equitable goals of the
court.320 Procedural due process requires a reasonable opportunity to be heard
and notice that is reasonably calculated.321 Section 102(1) encapsulates the
fundamental notions of procedural due process in bankruptcy proceedings.322
In Mathews v. Eldridge, the Supreme Court presented a utilitarian calculus for
considering how far the flexibility of due process can extend.323 This calculus
includes three factors: private interests, the risk of an erroneous deprivation,
315

In re Humboldt Creamery, LLC, No. 09-11078, 2009 WL 2820610, at *2 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Aug. 14,

2009).
316 Id. (“While nominally ‘presiding’ over the case, the judge is reduced to a figurehead without any
meaningful discretion and might as well leave his or her signature stamp with the debtor’s counsel and go on
vacation or shift attention to consumer cases where the law may still mean something.”).
317 Id.
318 In re Bombay Co., No. 07-44084-RFN-11, 2007 WL 2826071, at *3 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Sept. 26,
2007).
319 Id. at *3–4 (declining to assign responsibility for the contrived time trap, despite noting evidence of the
time trap); In re Tempo Tech. Corp., 202 B.R. 363, 367–70 (D. Del. 1996) (rejecting allegations that debtor
waited to complete negotiations with the buyer before filing bankruptcy).
320 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (“[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such
procedural protections as the particular situation demands.”).
321 Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
322 See Owens-Corning Fiberglass, Inc., v. Ctr. Wholesale, Inc. (In re Ctr. Wholesale, Inc.), 759 F.2d
1440, 1449 (9th Cir. 1985).
323 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 88, at 583 (discussing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
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and the government’s interest.324 For § 363 sales, the private interests are the
property rights of creditors. Property considerations are tempered by the
incremental increase in creditors’ rights from the creation of more procedural
hurdles to § 363 sales. These private interests are weighed against the
government’s interest in the program.325 Procedural due process is commonly
litigated within the context of administration of government programs, but
here, the government’s function is less direct: facilitating the reorganization of
distressed companies through the Code.
Few bankruptcy courts explicitly import the Mathews utilitarian calculus,
but the case shaped the jurisprudence of procedural due process.326 The
Northern District of Texas Court explicitly applied the analysis in In re Texas
Extrusion Corp.327 The court defined the private interest as the appellant’s
equity interest in the bankruptcy estate, or her husband’s property.328 The court
reasoned that since the estate was community property, the appellant received
constructive notice through her husband and additional notice to her directly
would not have mitigated the chance or erroneous deprivation.329 Because the
interest in finality outweighed the minimal benefits of a finding of inadequate
notice, the court held that there was no violation of the appellants’ due process
rights.330 Thus, the court held the equitable interests of third parties outweighed
the appellant’s harm from a technicality, not truly inadequate notice.331 In
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust, the Supreme Court endorsed such a
practical view of due process, declaring personal service of written notice to
unknown parties would be an unjustified obstacle.332 Consideration of the
rights of all parties need not lead to unreasonable results.333

324

Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
Id.
326 The case is commonly cited by courts for its holding that the “opportunity to be heard at a meaningful
time and in a meaningful manner.” Id. at 333; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 88, at 335.
327 Tex. Extrusion Corp. v. Palmer, Palmer & Coffee (In re Tex. Extrusion Corp.), 68 B.R. 712, 726 (N.D.
Tex. 1986), aff’d, 836 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1988), aff’d sub nom. Tex. Extrusion Corp. v. Lockheed Corp. (In re
Tex. Extrusion Corp.), 844 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir. 1988).
328 Id.
329 Id.
330 Id. at 727.
331 Id. at 726.
332 Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313–14 (1950).
333 GMAC Mortg. Corp. v. Salisbury (In re Loloee), 241 B.R. 655, 661–62 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1999)
(explaining that court must evaluate the difference between the notice that was given and what should have
been given if the Rules were followed to determine whether it flunks “due process”).
325
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The expedited process of § 363 sales coupled with the mootness protection
offers sophisticated debtors and buyers a mechanism to circumvent the rights
of other parties-in-interest.334 Congress recognized the tendency of debtors to
pacify large creditors, who hold leverage in the future reorganized debtor, at
the expense of small and scattered parties-in-interest.335 Unlike other areas of
law,336 bankruptcy precludes post-deprivation relief because of the inability to
undo a transaction.337 Thus, few remedies can be preserved that would not
disrupt the reorganization goals of the bankruptcy courts. Even if sale
authorization hearings occur, their pace can prevent creditors from putting
forth a meaningful objection.338 Courts are generally deferential to debtors
because of the aim to facilitate successful reorganizations,339 but the need for a
speedy reorganization should not outweigh assurance that due process rights
are preserved.340
In the Borders bankruptcy, the court recognized the importance of due
process rights even for small transactions.341 The judge sua sponte modified
the sale procedures because they violated creditors’ due process rights.342 The
debtor requested the court order a forward-looking finding of good faith, but
the court refused and instead required affirmative evidence of good faith for
any particular sale.343 The court also rejected the proposal that there would be
no notice on sales of assets worth under $300,000 and only five-days’ notice
for sales under $1 million.344
In some instances, creditors are sophisticated enough to formulate their
own objections to protect their due process rights. In other instances, the court
334

See LOPUCKI, supra note 30, at 167–69 (arguing that some approved sales are doubtfully even legal).
S. REP. No. 95-989, at 10 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5796.
336 E.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 260–66 (1970) (discussing the possibility of post-deprivation
relief in the cessation of welfare benefits and contrasting with other interests).
337 Lindsey Freeman, Comment, BAPCPA and Bankruptcy Direct Appeals: The Impact of Procedural
Uncertainty of Predictable Precedent, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 543, 571 (2011).
338 See LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 11, at 40.
339 In re GSC, Inc., 453 B.R. 132, 174 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“Courts give deference to the debtor as
long as there is a ‘reasonable basis for its business decision.’”); see also LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 11, at
40 (stating that as of the time of publication, there was no modern case where a large public company
proposed a sale and the courts refused to approve it).
340 Citicorp Mortg., Inc. v. Brooks (In re Ex-Cel Concrete Co.), 178 B.R. 198, 205 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995)
(stating that the exigency and equitable aims of the bankruptcy code do not justify departures from due
process).
341 In re Borders Grp., Inc., 453 B.R. 477, 483–84 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 2011).
342 Id.
343 Id. at 484–85.
344 Id. at 483.
335
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will raise notice issues on its own recognizing unfair treatment of small
creditors, as the Borders court did. The debtor’s proposal in Borders would
have eliminated any meaningful opportunity to object.345 Notice and
opportunity to be heard is a hallmark of due process rights, but given that
§ 363(m) bars any appeal after sale authorization, a creditor stripped of notice
and an opportunity to be heard effectively has no rights or remedies
whatsoever.
B. Recommendations
Because of the desire to protect good faith purchasers, getting an appeal is
very challenging. Recognizing this, courts should endeavor to avoid appealable
issues arising. Courts should adopt an approach to § 363 sales that balances the
interests of protecting creditor rights without sacrificing the most attractive
aspects of bankruptcy—flexibility and finality.346 As discussed, such balancing
need not sacrifice effective reorganizations for technicalities.347 Rather, it
would weigh the incremental benefits to the creditor from the added protection
against the detriment to the reorganization. This approach should recognize
that a slightly less than optimal solution for the debtor could be justified by the
benefits of ensuring procedural safeguards. After sale authorization, stays
pending appeal should not be virtually unattainable remedies. If they are not
obtained though, courts should adopt the more equitable approach of
recognizing an exception to § 363(m), which grants relief when it is possible
without undermining finality before mooting an appeal.
1. Protecting from Powerful Creditors
A debtor who files for bankruptcy is desperate to reorganize as quickly and
efficiently as possible. When a buyer steps in willing to finance a
reorganization through the purchase of assets, that buyer has the debtor at its
mercy.348 Buyers always have an incentive to get a sale done as quickly as
possible, particularly when that sale bears no risk of future litigation.349 The
fact that a buyer wants a quick sale does not mean the debtor and the court

345

Cf. id. at 484. (rejecting the movants’ assertion that good faith be presumed).
See supra Part I.A.3.
347 See supra text accompanying notes 329–33.
348 See Frost, supra note 65, at 128–29; Charles Jordan Tabb, Emergency Preferential Orders in
Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 75, 79 (1991).
349 See supra Part II.A.2.
346
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must comply;350 the court’s role should be to protect the desperate debtor from
agreeing to conditions compelled out of duress, particularly when those
conditions sacrifice the rights of other creditors.351
The court, like the debtor, is captive to the parties in interest, particularly
since management involved with the daily operations of the business can best
assess the urgent status of a proposed sale.352 Courts import the business
judgment rule to give the debtors great deference and are reluctant to scrutinize
the proposed sales absent objections.353 A willing buyer may offer too
attractive an opportunity to give up because of a few offending points.354 The
bankruptcy court’s dilemma is whether to grant the order despite possible
problems or risk a failed reorganization; the short time to make the decision
exacerbates the problem.355
If courts import the business judgment rule from corporate law, they should
also import the increased skepticism of sales involving self-interested
transactions. When a sale is conducted, courts should seek proof that the debtor
carefully considered all its options, that an approved buyer is the highest
bidder, and that the auction procedures allowed fair solicitation of all bids.
Under Delaware corporate law, when a company is up for sale, courts apply
the Revlon doctrine, which shifts management’s fiduciary duties from the
corporation to obtaining the highest bid for shareholders.356 The doctrine
ensures a true market test that leaves no doubt as to the value of the
company.357 Because one of the primary justifications for market sales is their
ability to provide a more accurate valuation than the court could give on its

350

Adler, supra note 29, at 308.
In re Cloverleaf Enters., Inc., No. 09-20056, 2010 WL 1445487, at *2–3 (Bankr. D. Md. Apr. 2, 2010).
352 Miller & Waisman, supra note 46, at 154–55.
353 J. Seth Moore & Vincent P. Slusher, Bankruptcy Code Section 363 Sales: Trends and Opportunities,
2007 NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER 2, Sept. 2007, at *6, 8, available at Westlaw, 2007 No. 9 Norton Bankr. L.
Adviser 2 (citing Summit Land Co. v. Allen (In re Summit Land Co.), 13 B.R. 310, 315 (Bankr. D. Utah
1981)).
354 Roe & Skeel, supra note 29, at 736.
355 See generally Tabb, supra note 29 (discussing this overarching dilemma when considering emergency
orders).
356 Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del. 1986); Paramount
Comm. v. QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34 (Del.1994); see also In re PWS Holding Corp., 228 F.3d 224, 247 (3d
Cir. 2000) (declining to address whether Revlon duties are imposed in bankruptcy to fully market assets
because they would not be relevant in the situation); In re Bidermann Indus. U.S.A., Inc., 203 B.R. 547, 551
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997) (confirming the consensus that fiduciary duties applicable in corporate law continue to
operate in chapter 11 cases).
357 Adler, supra note 29, at 316.
351
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own,358 expedited sales should have a similar standard. Creditors’ interests, just
like shareholders’ interests, should not be auctioned off in a fire sale, but
should be carefully marketed to ensure they receive the highest bid for their
property. Courts can require that a § 363 motion include a disclosure of the
kind of sales processes undertaken and the reason the choice was made.359 As
in corporate law,360 bankruptcy does not require the debtor accept the highest
bid, but the best bid, so long as there is a legitimate business reason that makes
that bid better than the highest bid.361 However, a legitimate business reason
should be assessed in light of not just management’s best interest, but also the
creditors’ best interest.362
When a sale involves a powerful creditor, the court should exercise
heightened scrutiny of that creditor’s influence upon the debtor and how
proposed actions impact minority creditors. The significant deference afforded
to debtors in such circumstances is not justified, particularly because a debtors’
management does not have the same incentives as a solvent company.363 In
bankruptcy, management’s fiduciary duties shift from the corporation to the
creditors.364 Under the Code, a party may qualify as an “insider,” if it is
functionally equivalent to one of the enumerated definitions in § 101(31)(B)
and has the ability to coerce the debtor’s actions.365 Because a powerful
358 In re Gulf Coast Oil Corp., 404 B.R. 407, 424 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (“The principal justification for
§ 363(b) sales is that aggressive marketing in an active market assures that the estate will receive maximum
benefit.”). But see Robert E. Steinberg, The Seven Deadly Sins in § 363 Sales, AM. BANKR. INST. J., June 2005,
at 22 (“[T]he § 363 sale process fails to maximize value because debtor management is not able to lead the
process properly or does not recognize, due to inexperience with the process, the many pitfalls and
obstacles . . . .”).
359 See e.g., In re GSC, Inc., 453 B.R. 132, 169 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011); In re Integrated Res., Inc. 135
B.R. 746, 750 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 1992); In re Fin. News Network, Inc., 126 B.R. 152, 157 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1991).
360 Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 527 A.2d 1279 (Del. 1989) (holding that there is no set method of
fulfilling Revlon duties).
361 See supra Part I.A.3.
362 In re Cloverleaf Enters., Inc., No. 09-20056, 2010 WL 1445487, at *2–3 (Bankr. D. Md. Apr. 2, 2010).
363 See discussion supra Part II.B.
364 The breadth of this shift of duties varies based on the state corporate law. See generally Laura Lin,
Shift of Fiduciary Duty upon Corporate Insolvency: Proper Scope of Directors’ Duty to Creditors, 46 VAND.
L. REV. 1485, 1512 (1993); see also Prod. Res. Grp., LLC v. NCT Grp., Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 789–90 (Del. Ch.
2004) (disagreeing with the contention that there is a shift of duties from shareholders to creditors, but
reasoning instead that when companies are in the “zone of insolvency,” duties persist both constituencies).
Creditors do not have a direct claim for breach of fiduciary duty against directors. Mukamal v. Bakes, 378 F.
App’x 890, 898 (11th Cir. 2010) (interpreting N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla,
930 A.2d 92, 94 (Del. 2007)).
365 Schubert v. Lucent Techs., Inc. (In re Winstar Commc’ns), 554 F.3d 382, 396–97 (3d Cir. 2009)
(discussing the existence of non-statutory insiders who exert the equivalent control of statutory insiders).
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creditor-buyer can coerce the debtor, such sales merit heightened scrutiny. A
court should at least be satisfied that such a transaction is a bona fide arm’s
length transaction rather than a transaction driven by factors other than
fiduciary duties.366
When a sale is to be completed quickly, rather than inferring from the lack
of objections that the sale should go ahead, the court should make affirmative
findings that the sale is fair to creditors. If a creditor’s time to object is limited,
a sale could be moot before a creditor even discovers the problem. To
compensate for the condensed time in which creditors may not have an
opportunity to formulate meaningful objections, a court should exercise its
judgment to ensure that creditors are not being unfairly treated.367
The court should also require concrete evidence not just that a sale is
necessary, but also that it must be done within the short time frame requested.
Exigency alone is not sufficient to show why a sale must be done in a given
short time frame. A second best alternative, which ensures creditor rights, may
be preferable. For example, in GSC, the court held that even though the buyer
would not walk away from the sale, the potential for a lower price was enough
to justify accommodating the buyer’s demands.368 Here, the court capitulated
to an unhappy buyer, despite acknowledging the reorganization could survive
without doing so. Instead, courts should not circumvent creditor protections,
but rely on the debtor and buyer to work out the creditor’s objection without
sacrificing the highest bid, since eliciting the highest price is in the interest of
all parties.369
2. Providing an Opportunity for Review
Enforcing the fourteen-day stay provision of Rule 6004(h) will also prevent
buyers from exerting pressure to get a deal done faster. A mandatory cushion
removes the incentive for a buyer to push the debtor for an immediate sale,
366 In re Tidal Const. Co., Inc., 446 B.R. 620, 624 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2009) (citing In re Gen. Bearing
Corp., 136 B.R. 361 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992)); see also In re Borders Grp., Inc., 453 B.R. 477, 484–85 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2011) (explaining a purchaser’s lack of connections with the debtor is an indication of good faith).
367 See e.g., In re Naron & Wagner, Chartered, 88 B.R. 85, 89 (Bankr. D. Md. 1988) (ordering a second
round of notice statements, which minimally adequately notified creditors, in lieu of chapter 11 organization
disclosure); see also In re Bombay Co., No. 07-44084-RFN-11, 2007 WL 2826071, at *4 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
Sept. 26, 2007) (noting that even though there were some objectors, the court was not satisfied that all
potential objectors had the opportunity to voice their objections).
368 Supra Part II.A.2.
369 Courts in bankruptcy often defer to parties to work out conflicts, but in this situation courts may need
to intervene to ensure there are not persistent hold out problems.
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which would eliminate the possibility of appellate review.370 A statutory
waiting period would take it out of the debtor’s hands as a negotiating point.
This stay coupled with the mandatory twenty-one days’ notice will give a
creditor more time to formulate an objection. Only in the exceptional case
should notice be abbreviated to less than twenty-one days and to less than all
creditors. The approval provisions for notice should ensure that all creditors
are receiving not only adequate information, but also within a reasonably
advanced period to prepare meaningful objections.
An explicit standard requiring a minimum showing that a fourteen-day stay
is unduly burdensome for the debtor’s reorganization would help guarantee
more time for creditors to formulate objections. The mere desire of a purchaser
to get a sale done quickly does not justify depriving a creditor of time to
consider the ramifications of a sale and possible objections.
Once a sale order is approved, courts should be very willing to grant a stay
pending appeal, unless the grounds for appeal are unfounded. Once a court
denies a stay and a sale consummates, the potential appellant with a
meritorious claim is irreparably harmed.371 The irreparable harm standard
should apply consistently for creditors and debtor movants: if courts accept the
debtors speculative arguments of harm to the company by not completing a
sale immediately, a creditor’s concrete harm of not being able to undo a sale
should receive equal weight, as the court in Adelphia recognized.372
Consideration of a stay must consider this threat foremost rather than circularly
focusing on whether the already court-authorized sale is immediately necessary
for reorganization. If a bankruptcy court denies a stay pending appeal, a party
may attempt an expedited appeal of the denial.373 Making this form of review
more readily available allows a different court to review whether the
bankruptcy court’s deference to the debtor was excessive and whether the
creditor’s objections merit review.
The speculative harm of the bidder paying a lower price after waiting for an
appeal would be mitigated by the appellant’s willingness to post a bond.
370 Kuney, supra note 107, at 271; see also Bruce H. White & William L. Medford, Equitable Mootness
and Substantial Consummation: Are You Losing Your Appeal?, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Feb. 2001, at 26, 26–27.
371 See supra Part I.C.
372 See supra notes 120–22 and accompanying text.
373 FED. R. BANKR. P. 8011. Chrysler was an example of stay denial that was emergency appealed to the
court of appeals; see also In re Boscov’s, Inc., No. 08-11637 (KG), 2008 WL 4975882 (Bankr. D. Del. Nov.
21, 2008).
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Payment of the bond indemnifies the party whose action the stay pending
appeal halts, in the event the appealing party does not prevail.374 This
requirement limits the parties who would seek stays to those confident their
appeal has merit and that they would not lose money on the appeal.375
3. Equitably Interpreting Mootness
Section 363(m) should not serve to moot all unstayed appeals. Courts,
uncomfortable with such a harsh result, have carved out an array of narrow
exceptions.376 Ultimately, courts have incorporated the principles of equitable
mootness to interpret the statutory mootness provision. The speed of the § 363
sales makes them more vulnerable to abuses and unfairness than a
reorganization plan.377 This should make the sales more, not less, prone to
review and the consideration of whether fair remedies are available. At the
least, the doctrine of equitable mootness should explicitly apply to both
reorganization plans and the sales, which are increasingly replacing plans.
While the application of the doctrine is not entirely predictable the way a per
se rule is, it does operate effectively in reorganization plans to preserve finality
without condoning potentially grave injustices to creditors.
A narrower interpretation of § 363(m) could decrease the use of § 363
sales, since statutory mootness is a benefit of § 363 sales. However, an
expedited process creates myriad windows for abuse. If debtors have a real
choice between using a process that limits the protections for creditors versus a
reorganization plan, a preference for plans with full creditor protections is
desirable.378 The doctrine of necessity is not for routine use, but rather an
alternative in an emergency.379 The threat of contrived emergencies exists;

374

FED. R. BANKR. P. 8005.
Kuney, supra note 107. FED. R. BANKR. P. 7062 incorporates FED. R. CIV. P. 62(d), which does not
specify how to calculate a bond amount, but courts have read in the requirements of its predecessor, as some
proportion of the judgment remaining unsatisfied. Poplar Grove Planting & Refining Co. v. Bache Halsey
Stuart, Inc., 600 F.2d 1189, 1191 (5th Cir. 1979).
376 Supra Part II.C.2.
377 In re Gulf Coast Oil Corp., 404 B.R. 407, 423–24 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009).
378 E.g., In re Bombay Co., No. 07-44084-RFN-11, 2007 WL 2826071, at *3 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Sept. 26,
2007) (stating its preference for plans to § 363 sales). However, there is no clear evidence that decreasing the
breadth of mootness will dissuade debtors from using this option. See Part II.C.2–3.
379 In re CoServ, LLC, 273 B.R. 487, 491 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002) (explaining doctrine of necessity is to
be used only in rare cases); Official Asbestos Claimants’ Comm. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., (In re Babcock &
Wilcox Co.), 274 B.R. 230, 256 n.208 (Bankr. E.D. La. 2002) (same); In re C.A.F. Bindery, 199 B.R. 828,
835–36 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) (mentioning doctrine receives limited application); Joseph Gilday, “Critical”
Error: Why Essential Vendor Payments Violate the Bankruptcy Code, 11 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 411, 432
375
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buyers seeking the protections of no possibility of appeal should be treated as
suspect.380 Thus, limiting mootness, and the potential for its abuse, is
appropriate. Courts should demonstrate a willingness to consider equitable
considerations for statutory mootness in a similar fashion to all other
bankruptcy matters, so that incentives for expedition to cloak abuse in
mootness do not exist. Additionally, courts should always allow appeals on the
issue of good faith, since the lack thereof fails to comply with the good faith
purchaser requirement of § 363(m).381 Not allowing such appeals does not
further the interest of finality, but creates a perverse incentive for buyers.
The Supreme Court has reiterated that “[t]he need for expedition, however,
is not a justification for abandoning proper standards.”382 The proper standards
and protections throughout chapter 11 should apply to § 363 sales, even where
the justification for an emergency sale exist.
CONCLUSION
Section 363 sales are an important tool in bankruptcy. The public has an
interest in concluding bankruptcies quickly and efficiently.383 But, efficiency
comes at a price: a less thorough process, creating vulnerabilities to creditors’
rights. A long appeals process does not serve the interests of efficiency. Like
all due process, there must be a balance between protecting the most sacrosanct
of procedural rights (a fair chance to protect one’s property and the right to
appeal an unjust verdict) and what is reasonable under the circumstances. Any
solution to a problem in bankruptcy must evaluate not only the interests of the
debtor (and future debtors) in a vacuum, but also the creditor’s potential
deprivation of property and the subsequent loss of review on appeal.384
Congress included § 363 in recognition of the fact that reorganization plans are
not always practical; nonetheless, there should be a greater onus on the party
(2003) (citing In re Chandlier, 292 B.R. 583, 588 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2003) (stating the doctrine of necessity
allows payment in chapter 11 case under very extraordinary circumstances)).
380 Cf. Craig A. Sloane, supra note 14, at 60 (citing In re Public Serv. Co., 90 B.R. 575, 581–82 n.7
(Bankr. D.N.H. 1988)) (“Congress could not have intended for the extensive disclosure requirements under
§ 1125 to be superseded by mere notice and the remaining chapter 11 protections reduced to the ‘business
justification’ test.”).
381 See supra Part II.D.3.
382 Protective Comm. for Indep. Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 450
(1968); see also Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2620 (2011) (“We cannot compromise the integrity of the
system of separated powers and the role of the Judiciary in that system, even with respect to challenges that
may seem innocuous at first blush.”).
383 Jones, supra note 104, at 266.
384 See Eisenberg & Gecker, supra note 120, at 62.
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seeking to avoid the chapter 11 protections to show that the remedy is not only
necessary, but also in good faith and protects creditor rights.
The mootness provisions and doctrines in bankruptcy highlight and protect
bona fide purchasers. However, as integral to bankruptcy as these principles
are, they cannot swallow the integrity of the system’s foundation: its process.
The uproar after Chrysler and GM were examples of high-profile incidents,
which could lead creditors to become more apprehensive about lending
companies money.385 This Comment does not call for a guarantee to an appeal.
Rather, it calls for a consistent application of equitable principles in the
universe of mootness. Treating mootness consistently in chapter 11
reorganizations and § 363 sales preserves the bankruptcy judge’s equitable
powers without creating an expedited loophole that can compromise the
protection of creditor’s rights.
ALLA RAYKIN∗
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See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX A
The below charts were made using data from the UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy
Research Database. The data is somewhat limited, but should serve as an
adequate indicator of general trends. The universe of data includes only
debtors who had assets of $100 million or more, and filed an annual report (10K) with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
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CHART 2 – 363 SALES IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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APPENDIX B
The below chart was compiled using data from West. The data consists of all
§ 363 sales that came up in a search for trial court documents motioning for
§ 363(b) sales. While the data compares the entire Ninth Circuit to district
courts, and only represents a sample, it demonstrates there was no aberration in
the general volume of sales in Ninth Circuit in comparison with other courts
after the Clear Channel decision.
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